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TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN ANCIENT ATHENS:                     
A CASE STUDY 
ADRIAAN LANNI* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article presents our first well-documented example of a 
self-conscious  transitional  justice  policy—the  classical  Athenians’ 
response  to  atrocities  committed  during  the  reign  of  the  Thirty 
Tyrants—as a case study that can offer insight into the design of 
modern transitional justice institutions.  The Athenians carefully 
balanced  retribution  and  forgiveness:    an  amnesty  protected 
collaborators  from  direct  prosecution,  but  in  practice  private 
citizens  could  indirectly  sanction  even  low-level  oligarchic 
sympathizers by raising their collaboration as character evidence in 
unrelated  lawsuits.    They  also  balanced  remembering  and 
forgetting:  discussion of the civil war in the courts memorialized 
the atrocities committed during the tyranny but also whitewashed 
the  widespread  collaboration  by  ordinary  citizens,  depicting  the 
majority of the populace as members of the democratic resistance.  
This  case  study  of  Athens’  successful  reconciliation  offers  new 
insight  into  contemporary  transitional  justice  debates.    The 
Athenian experience suggests that the current preoccupation with 
uncovering the truth may be misguided.  The Athenian case also 
counsels that providing an avenue for individual victims to pursue 
local grievances can help minimize the impunity gap created by 
the inevitably selective nature of transitional justice. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Most accounts of transitional justice institutions begin with the 
Nuremberg  and  Tokyo  trials  following  World  War  II.1  B u t ,  o f  
 
* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.  I would like to thank Victor Bers, 
Gabriela Blum, Rachel Brewster, Glenn Cohen, Michael Gagarin, James Gibson, 
Ryan Goodman, James Greiner, Daniel Ho, Wesley Kelman, Duncan Kennedy, 
Daryl Levinson, Jenny Martinez, Martha Minow, Josiah Ober, Benjamin Roin, Jed 
Shugerman,  Benjamin  Sachs,  Matthew  Stephenson,  Detlev  Vagts,  Adrian 
Vermeule, and Robert Weisberg for helpful suggestions related to this project.  
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course, the challenge of moving on after civil war or mass atrocity 
is  much  older—as  old  as  organized  society  itself.    The  ancient 
Athenian democracy provides our first well-documented example 
of a self-conscious transitional justice policy.  This case study of 
Athens’  successful  reconciliation  following  civil  war  offers  new 
insight  into  several  contemporary  debates  over  the  design  of 
modern  transitional  justice  institutions.    More  specifically,  the 
Athenian experience suggests that the current focus on uncovering 
the truth may be misguided.  The Athenian case also counsels that 
providing  an  avenue  for  individual  victims  to  pursue  local 
grievances  can  help  minimize  the  impunity  gap  created  by  the 
inevitably selective nature of transitional justice. 
In  404  B.C.E.,  Athens  experienced  a  civil  war  marked  by 
horrific violence:  in an eight month-period, an oligarchic coup led 
by the “Thirty Tyrants” resulted in the killing of between five and 
ten  percent  of  the  citizenry  as  well  as t h e  e x p u l s i o n ,  b y  s o m e  
accounts,  of  more  than  half  the  population.2  T h e  r e s t o r e d  
democracy  arrived  at  a  careful  balance  between  retribution  and 
forgiveness.  Formally, all but the top officials in the former regime 
were  given  amnesty,  but  in  practice  private  citizens  could 
indirectly  sanction  even  low-level  oligarchic  sympathizers  by 
raising  their  collaboration  as  character  evidence  in  unrelated 
lawsuits.    The  Athenians  also  balanced  remembering  and 
forgetting:  discussion of the civil war in the courts memorialized 
 
1 See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS 27 (1998) 
(“By  the e n d  o f  t h e  t w e n t i e t h  c e n t u r y ,  p o l i t i c i a n s ,  l e a d e r s ,  a n d  h u m a n  r i g h t s  
activists cited these trials as landmark contributions to the struggles for a just 
world order.”). 
2 For  discussion  on  the  number  of  Athenians  killed,  see  ISOCRATES, 
Areopagiticus, in ISOCRATES I 182, 197 (David C. Mirhady & Yun Lee Too trans., 
Univ.  of  Tex. P r e s s  2 0 0 0 )  ( d i s c u s s i n g  h o w  t h e  T h i r t y  Tyrants  executed  fifteen 
hundred c i t i z e n s  w i t h o u t  t r i a l )  [Isoc.  7.67];  AESCHINES,  Against  Ctesiphon, i n  
AESCHINES 159, 244 (Chris Carey trans., Univ. of Tex. Press 2000) [Aesch. 3.235]; 
ARISTOTLE, The Constitution of Athens, in ARISTOTLE AND XENOPHON ON DEMOCRACY 
AND  OLIGARCHY  139,  178  (J.M.  Moore  trans.,  1986)  (showing  that  the  Thirty 
embarked on a killing rampage, killing “no less than fifteen hundred men”) [Ar. 
Ath. Pol. 35.4]; BARRY S. STRAUSS, ATHENS  AFTER  THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 70–86 
(1986) (providing a figure for the lowest estimate of the male citizen population at 
14,000–16,250); JOSIAH OBER, MASS  AND ELITE  IN DEMOCRATIC ATHENS 127 (1989) 
(estimating that the population range throughout the fourth century was 20,000-
30,000).  As for the expulsion, see DIODORUS OF SICILY, Book XIV, in DIODORUS OF 
SICILY VI 1, 23 (C. H. Oldfather trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1933) (stating that more 
than half the Athenian population was driven to flee by the murders and lawless 
actions of the Thirty) [Diodorus Diod. 14.5.7]; ISOCRATES, supra note 2, at 182, 197 
(declaring that over five thousand were expelled) [Isoc. 7.67].   Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1740623
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the atrocities committed during the tyranny but also whitewashed 
the  widespread  collaboration  by  ordinary  citizens,  depicting  the 
majority of the populace as members of the democratic resistance.  
The  Athenian  reconciliation,  which  endured  until  Athens  was 
defeated by Philip of Macedon, was admired throughout Greece 
for  its  success  in  avoiding  the  cycle  of  revolution  and  counter-
revolution  that  afflicted  other  Greek  city-states  in  the  classical 
period. 
This  Article b e g i n s  b y  e x a m i n i n g  w h y  t h e  A t h e n i a n  
reconciliation was so successful.  I argue that Athens’ unique legal 
culture permitted the amnesty to be implemented in a way that 
promoted  unity  while  at  the  same  time  avoiding  a  sense  of 
impunity at the local level.  There were three aspects to this.  First, 
in  the  generation  following  the  war,  speeches  in  the  Athenian 
courts  helped  cultivate  reconciliation  by  creating  a  unifying 
(though m i s l e a d i n g )  c o l l e c t i v e  m e m o r y  o f  t h e  c i v i l  w a r  t h a t  
focused  blame  narrowly  on  the  Thirty  Tyrants,  downplayed  the 
extent  of  collaboration,  and  depicted  the  Amnesty  not  as  a 
politically  expedient  compromise  but  as  proof  of  the  Athenians’ 
moderation and superior character.  Second, litigants’ collaboration 
or  resistance  during  the  tyranny  was  often  raised  as c h a r a c t e r  
evidence  in  unrelated  lawsuits  and  in  fitness  examinations  for 
public officials.  Athenian jury verdicts could turn on this evidence, 
and the very experience of being accused of collaboration before 
hundreds  of  jurors  constituted  a  form  of  shaming  punishment.  
These indirect sanctions minimized resentment at the local level by 
providing  some  limited  accountability  for  crimes  committed 
during  the  war,  while  also  encouraging  former  collaborators  to 
publicly pledge their allegiance to the democracy.  Finally, Athens’ 
civic  institutions,  including  courts,  required  the  regular,  active 
participation of Athenian citizens.  These institutions helped repair 
individual  social  relationships  by  forcing  former  oligarchs  and 
democratic rebels to work together productively. 
Can the Athenian experience tell us something about how we 
should  respond  to  civil  war  and  mass  atrocity  today?    Ancient 
Athens  may  seem  too  far  removed  from  the  modern  cultural 
context to provide a useful comparison.  But those who study and 
design transitional justice institutions are already in the business of 
trying to draw lessons from settings that are quite different from 
one  another—from  Latin  America  to  Western  Europe  to  South 
Africa  to  Rwanda  to  Cambodia.    In  addition,  scholars  of 
transitional  justice  have  tried  to  draw  lessons  from  historical  as LANNI.DOC  1/9/11  7:45 PM 
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well  as  contemporary  transitions.3  A t h e n s  o f f e r s  a n o t h e r  c a s e  
study—in  some  ways  an  exceptionally  useful  one,  because  we 
know that the Athenian reconciliation worked over the long term. 
Of course, definitive conclusions cannot be drawn from a single 
case study.  We will see that the Athenians’ idiosyncratic attitude 
toward  the  rule  of  law  precludes  the  direct  adoption  of  the 
Athenian approach.  But we may be able to draw some mid-level 
observations  from  the  Athenian  case,  observations  that  may  be 
worth  testing  against  other  case  studies  in  future  transitional 
justice research while bearing in mind the design of contemporary 
transitional justice institutions. 
First, the Athenian reconciliation demonstrates the importance 
of addressing reconciliation on the local level, both by providing 
an outlet for private resentments and by encouraging individuals 
on  opposite  sides  of  the  conflict  to  work  together.    Centralized 
institutions that focus exclusively on high-level offenders may not 
be  as  effective  as  schemes  that  permit  individual  victims  to  air 
complaints.    Such  decentralized,  victim-centered  approaches  can 
take  many  forms;  recent  transitional  justice  experiments  that 
incorporate  this  feature  include  South  Africa’s  Truth  and 
Reconciliation  Commission  and  Rwanda’s  Gacaca c o u r t s .   M o s t  
controversially,  the  Athenian  case  casts  some  doubt  on  an 
assumption  underlying  the  recent  proliferation  of  truth 
commissions:  the cardinal value of uncovering the truth behind 
the violence.     
Section 1 introduces the paper while Section 2 briefly describes 
the reign of the Thirty Tyrants and the terms of the reconciliation 
agreement.    Sections  3  and  4  explore  why  the  Athenian 
reconciliation  succeeded,  tracing  the  decisive  role  played  by  the 
Athenian courts.  Section 5 discusses what we might learn from 
Athens’ successful response to mass atrocity. 
 
3 See  generally  JON  ELSTER,  CLOSING  THE  BOOKS:  TRANSITIONAL  JUSTICE  IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2004) (discussing several historical transitions, including 
Athens in 411 and 403 B.C. and France from 1814–1815); MINOW,  supra  note 1 
(including  a  variety  of  historical  examples,  including  most  prominently,  post-
World War II Germany); RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 27 (2000) (discussing 
a  variety  of  transitions,  including  those  in  Germany,  Argentina,  Greece,  Latin 
America, Central Europe, and Latin America); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, 
Transitional  Justice  as  Ordinary  Justice, 1 1 7  HARV.  L.  REV.  762,  771–77  (2004) 
(examining a wide range of historical transitions, including the American Civil 
War and the French Revolution). LANNI.DOC  1/9/11  7:45 PM 
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2.  THE TERROR 
More Athenians were killed by the Thirty Tyrants in their nine-
month  reign  than  were  killed  in  ten  years  during  the 
Peloponnesian  War.4  W h a t  f o l l o w s  i s  a  b a s i c  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  
violence, with a particular emphasis on what we can discern about 
the  level  of  complicity  of  various  elements  of  the  population.  
Although  there  are  discrepancies  in  the  sources  and  many  facts 
about  the  oligarchic  period  are  still  contested  by  historians,5 
particularly  the  chronology  of  events,  these  debates  are  not 
relevant to our story and I will largely avoid them. 
2.1.  Accession of the Thirty and Judicial Murder 
The  Athenian  Assembly  had  little  choice  in  the  initial 
appointment  of  the  Thirty.    The  Athenians  had  been  soundly 
defeated by the Spartans and were literally starving because of a 
Spartan blockade when they agreed to surrender, tear down their 
walls, and hand over most of their fleet.  Under pressure from the 
Spartan commander,6 the Assembly acceded to the local oligarchic 
faction  and  appointed  thirty  men  to  draft  a  constitution  in 
accordance with the ancestral laws (patrioi nomoi).7  Once in power, 
the  Thirty  ignored  the  order  to  draft  a  constitution  and  instead 
appointed magistrates and a new Council of 500 from among their 
supporters.8  Even more ominous, they hired 300 “whip-bearing 
 
4 See XENOPHON, HELLENICA 157 (Carleton Brownson trans., Harvard Univ. 
Press  1918)  (showing  that  the  number  of  fatalities  was  less  during  the 
Peloponnesian War than during the reign of the Thirty Tyrants) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.21]. 
5 See, e.g., PETER KRENTZ, THE THIRTY  AT ATHENS 64–67 (1982) (highlighting 
competing theories regarding certain aspects of the reign of the Thirty); THOMAS 
CLARK  LOENING,  THE  RECONCILIATION  AGREEMENT  OF  403/402  B.C. I N  ATHENS 
(1987) (examining the reconciliation agreement in depth); MARTIN OSTWALD, FROM 
POPULAR  SOVEREIGNTY  TO  THE  SOVEREIGNTY  OF  LAW 4 6 0 –90  (1986)  (detailing  the 
reign of the Thirty); ANDREW WOLPERT, REMEMBERING DEFEAT (2002) (analyzing the 
civil  war  and  its  aftermath);  Edwin  Carawan,  Amnesty  and  Accountings  for  the 
Thirty, 56.1 CLASSICAL Q. 57, 57–76 (2006) (calling into question an interpretation of 
the nature of the accounting levied in the aftermath of the civil war). 
6 See LYSIAS, Against Eratosthenes, in LYSIAS 113, 131 (S.C. Todd trans., Univ. of 
Tex. P r e s s  2 0 0 0 )  ( r e v e a l i n g  t h e  S p a r t a n  L ysander’s  threat  to  the  lives  of  the 
assemblymen) [Lys. 12.71–75]; DIODORUS,  supra  note 2, at 14–17  (showing  how 
Lysander ordered the appointment of the Thirty to head the state) [Diod. 14.3.2–
7]. 
7 See  XENOPHON,  supra  note  4,  at  116–19  (illustrating  the  first  treacherous 
steps the oligarchy took with the consent of Lysander) [Xen. Hell. 2.3.11–14]. 
8 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 177 (stating that the Thirty disregarded the 
purpose  for  which  they  had  been  appointed  and  proceeded  to  use  their LANNI.DOC  1/9/11  7:45 PM 
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servants” to carry out their orders and intimidate the populace.9  
While it is not clear whether the Assembly decree appointing the 
Thirty  authorized  them  to  govern  Athens  temporarily  until  the 
new  constitution  was  drafted,10 t h e r e  i s  n o  q u e s t i o n  t h a t  b y  
refusing to issue a constitution and taking complete and indefinite 
control over the government, the Thirty crossed the line into illegal 
rule. 
The  Thirty  immediately  set  to  work  eliminating  their 
opponents.  Jury courts had been suspended during the war and 
were not revived by the Thirty.  Instead, the Thirty tried opponents 
before  the  Council  of  500,  which  they  packed  with  their  own 
supporters.  This was judicial murder.  The trials appear to have 
been a farce:  they dispensed with the secret ballot, and often relied 
on  evidence  from  informants  coerced  to  testify  under  threat  of 
death.11  One description of a trial held soon after the Thirty rose to 
power against men who had opposed the peace treaty with Sparta 
recounts the intimidating atmosphere, as members of the Council 
publicly cast their votes in front of the Thirty. 
The Thirty were seated on the dais.  Two tables were set out 
in front of them, and one had to cast one’s vote not into 
voting  urns  but  openly  on  these  tables,  with  the  vote  to 
convict going on the further table:  so how could any of 
them [i.e., the defendants] be rescued?  In a word, the death 
penalty  was  passed  on  all  who  went  to  the  Council-
chamber to face trial.12 
 
appointment  to  wrest  and  maintain  control  of  the  city)  [Ar.  Ath.  Pol.  35.1]; 
XENOPHON, supra note 4, 116–19 (detailing how the Thirty misused their office to 
further their own goals) [Xen. Hell. 2.3.11–14]. 
9 See ARISTOTLE, The Constitution of Athens, supra note 2, at 139, 177 (discussing 
how the hiring of such servants was part of the oligarchy’s plan to control the 
city) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 35.1]. 
10 The  subject  of  politeusousi i n  X e n o p h o n ’ s  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  A s s e m b l y  
decree is unclear, but may refer to the Thirty.  XENOPHON, supra note 4, 113–15 
[Xen.  Hell.  2.3.2].    For  discussion,  see  OSTWALD,  supra  note  5,  at  477–78, n . 7 0  
(attempting to determine the exact powers conferred on the Thirty); KRENTZ, supra 
note 5, at 50 (arguing that the Thirty were elected as a government and not simply 
as a legislative commission). 
11 See  LYSIAS,  Against  Agoratus,  in  LYSIAS,  supra n o t e  6 ,  a t   137,  147,  151–52 
(detailing the unfair mode by which the victims were put to death) [Lys. 13.36, 61–
62]; XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 122–23 (showing that the Thirty killed on account 
of personal enmity and expediency) [Xen. Hell. 2.3.20–22]. 
12 LYSIAS, Against Agoratus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 137, 147, 151–52 [Lys. 
13.36, 61–62]. LANNI.DOC  1/9/11  7:45 PM 
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At first, the Thirty executed only a small number of political 
opponents and “sycophants” (men known for bringing frivolous 
prosecutions).  Despite the procedural irregularity of these trials, 
both  Xenophon  and  Aristotle’s  the  Constitution  of  the  Athenians13 
report that these actions were widely popular.14  Over time, the 
executions multiplied, and, with them, opposition to the regime:  
Xenophon  describes  the  “great  numbers  continually—and 
unjustly—put  to  death,”  causing  “many  to  band  together  and 
wonder what the state was coming to.”15 
2.2. The Creation of the 3000 and Widespread Extrajudicial Killings 
Theramenes,  one  of  the  Thirty,  opposed  the  prosecutions, 
arguing that the terror tactics were alienating potential supporters 
and  weakening  the  regime.    In  response,  the  Thirty  agreed  to 
widen their base of support slightly by drawing up a list of 3000 
citizens  who  would  participate  in  the  government, 
disenfranchising the remaining three-quarters of the population.16  
To the extent we can discern the motivations of the Thirty, they 
appear  to  have  wanted  to  establish  a  society  along  the  Spartan 
model, in which a narrow group of elite homoioi would exercise 
citizenship rights, relegating the rest of the population to a second-
class status.17  The 3000 appear to have been handpicked by the 
 
13 The  Constitution  of  the  Athenians  was  not  an  enacted  constitution,  but  a 
partial  history  and  description  of  Athenian  political  and  legal  institutions 
probably  written  by  Aristotle  or  his  students.    See  ADRIAAN  LANNI,  LAW  AND 
JUSTICE IN THE COURTS OF CLASSICAL ATHENS 6 (2006). 
14 See XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 118–19 (showing that citizens who were not 
under threat of guilt were pleased with the first condemnatory and punitive steps 
of the Thirty) [Xen. Hell. 2.3.12]; ARISTOTLE, The Constitution of Athens, supra note 2, 
at 139, 178 (describing the initial delight of the populace with the actions of the 
Thirty that they deemed to be motivated by noble intentions) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 35.3]. 
15 See XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 122–23 (showing Theramenes’ musings on 
whether the state was being led in a good direction) [Xen. Hell. 2.3.20–22]. 
16 See  ARISTOTLE,  The  Constitution  of  Athens,  supra  note  2,  at 1 3 9 ,  1 7 8  
(describing the circumstances leading to the list of 3000 as well as Theramenes’ 
criticisms of the creation of the list) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 36.1–2]; see also XENOPHON, supra 
note 4, at 121–23 (describing the creation of the 3000 as a response to Theramenes’ 
concerns about the disempowerment of the citizens under the oligarchy) [Xen. 
Hell. 2.3.18–22]. 
17 See, e.g., KRENTZ, supra note 5, at 64–67 (stating that the Thirty attempted to 
reform Athens using a “model of idealized Sparta” and comparing the structural 
hierarchy of the Thirty and the 3000 with the structures of Sparta’s government); 
see also OSTWALD, supra note 5, at 485–87 (analyzing the adoption of portions of the 
Spartan system by the Thirty and comparing and contrasting the 3000 with the 
Spartan homoioi and hoplite class); David Whitehead, Sparta and the Thirty Tyrants, LANNI.DOC  1/9/11  7:45 PM 
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Thirty.18  In practice, the 3000 did not play an active role in the 
government; we know of only one meeting of the full 3000 and one 
other meeting involving all hoplites and cavalry on the list, both of 
which were held after the democratic opposition had gained the 
upper hand and the Thirty was on the defensive.19 
The  consequences  of  exclusion  from  the  list  of  3000  went 
beyond the humiliation of formal disenfranchisement.  The Thirty 
announced  that  anyone  not  in  the  3000  could  be  killed  by  the 
Thirty without trial, while members of the 3000 had a right to a 
trial  before  the  Council.20  N o t  l o n g  a f t e r  t h e  l i s t  o f  3 0 0 0  w a s  
published, the Thirty collected the arms of the disenfranchised and 
began a brutal killing spree.21  Xenophon suggests that many of the 
murders  were  motivated  by  personal  enmity  or  a  desire  to 
confiscate  property  rather  than  because  of  political  opposition.22  
The Thirty’s decision to kill a number of metics (resident aliens) at 
one  point  was  attributed  to  several  different  motivations:  
xenophobia, elimination of the political opposition, and the desire 
to confiscate property.23  Isocrates claims that the number of people 
 
in 13/14 ANCIENT SOCIETY 106, 106–30 (1982–83) (discussing the reasons why the 
Thirty sought to remodel Athenian society as Sparta). 
18 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 178 (describing the arbitrary factors used by 
the Thirty to select the list of 3000 and the secrecy surrounding the list and its 
revisions prior to its delayed publication) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 36.2]. 
19 See, e.g., XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 148–49, 156–59 (discussing the limited, 
inconsistent participation of the 3000 in the violence and the minor role of the 
3000 during the deposition of the Thirty) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.9, 2.4.23]; ARISTOTLE, supra 
note 2, at 179 (describing the marginal role of the 3000 within the violent rule of 
the Thirty) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 38.1]. 
20 See  ARISTOTLE,  supra  note  2,  at  178  (suggesting  that  the  additional 
protection granted to the 3000 was minimal and arguing that the list of 3000 did 
not  create  a  significant  obstacle  to  the  Thirty’s  attempts  to  rid  themselves  of 
opposition)  [Ar.  Ath.  Pol.  36.1];  XENOPHON,  supra  note  4,  at  120–21,  139–41 
(describing how the Thirty simply struck Theramenes’ name from the list of 3000 
when  it  became  apparent  that  the  Council  would  not  vote  to  condemn 
Theramenes and executed him without the vote) [Xen. Hell. 2.3.18, 2.3.50–51]. 
21 See  ARISTOTLE,  supra  note  2,  at  179  (detailing  the  disarmament  of  the 
general population and the continuing violence of the Thirty) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 37.2]; 
see also XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 145 (describing the growing confidence of the 
Thirty and the expanding scope of their actions) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.1]. 
22 See  XENOPHON,  supra  note  4,  at  123  (stating  that  the  Thirty  “put  many 
people to death out of personal enmity, and many also for the sake of securing 
their property.”) [Xen. Hell. 2.3.20–21]. 
23 Xenophon  (2.3.20-22)  and  Lysias  (12.6)  attribute  the  Thirty’s  actions  to 
greed.    XENOPHON,  supra  note  4,  at  123  [Xen.  Hell.  2.3.20–22];  LYSIAS,  Against 
Eratosthenes, in LYSIAS supra note 6, at 113, 116–17 [Lys. 12.4].  Others dismiss the 
arguments attributing the murders to greed and fear and suggest that the Thirty LANNI.DOC  1/9/11  7:45 PM 
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executed without trial by the Thirty over these three months was 
more than the number of subjects the Athenians put on trial during 
the entire period of its empire.24 
2.3. Informers and Citizens’ Arrests 
In addition to acquiescing to the senseless violence, ordinary 
citizens  sometimes  served  as  informers  or  assisted  in  arrests.  
However rigged they may have been, trials before the Council still 
required  some  showing  of  evidence;  this  evidence  could  be 
provided by willing or unwilling informers.  The trial of one such 
informer  after  the  restoration  of  the  democracy  survives.25  
Predictably, the defendant seems to have made the assertion that 
he only testified because he was under duress, but the prosecution 
argues that the defendant was a willing informant, pointing out 
that the defendant had a chance to escape and refuse to become an 
informant by fleeing Athens but did not take it.26  Interestingly, the 
prosecutor’s narrative reveals that informers were often subject to 
considerable pressure.  The prosecutor recounts how another man, 
Menestratus, became an informer only after he was arrested on a 
capital  charge  so  that  he  could  gain  immunity;  the  prosecutor 
praises the heroism of one Aristophanes who refused to become an 
informant and was executed as a result; and the prosecutor’s case 
is predicated on the notion that the defendant would have had to 
go into voluntary exile to avoid serving as an informer.27 
The guilt of citizens who actually carried out arrests and turned 
individuals  over  to  the  Thirty  is  murkier.    In  Plato’s  Apology, 
Socrates recounts how the Thirty ordered him and four others to 
arrest Leon of Salamis so that he could be put to death.  According 
 
ordered the killings to suppress political opposition.  See KRENTZ, supra note 5, at 
80–82.    Xenophobia  is  also  presented  as  a  possible  motivation  for  the  Thirty’s 
action against the metics.  See OSTWALD, supra note 5, at 487. 
24 See  ISOCRATES,  Panegyricus,  in  ISOCRATES  II 2 3 ,  5 5 –56 ( T e r r y  L .  P a p i l l o n  
trans., 2004) [Isoc. 4.113]. 
25 See LYSIAS, Against Agoratus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 140–60 (prosecuting 
Agoratus for his actions as an informer) [Lys. 13]. 
26 See  id.  at  146,  149–50 ( s t a t i n g  t h a t  A g o r a t u s  c o u l d  h a v e  l e f t  i n s t e a d  o f  
becoming  an  informant  but  chose  to  stay  because  he  believed  he  would  be 
rewarded for being an informant) [Lys. 13.31, 52]. 
27 See id. at 149–52 (arguing that Agoratus was guilty of the same crimes as 
Menestratus  and  therefore  should  be  punished  with  the  same  sentence  as 
Menestratus and suggesting that Agoratus should be responsible for his choice 
because  others  such  as  Aristophanes  did  not  make  the  same  decision  under 
similar circumstances) [Lys. 13.52–61]. LANNI.DOC  1/9/11  7:45 PM 
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to  Socrates,  the  Thirty  “often  ordered  many  others  to  do  such 
things,  since  they  wanted  to  implicate  as  many  others  in  their 
causes.”28  W h i l e  t h e  f o u r  o t h e r s  a r r e s t e d  L e o n ,  S o c r a t e s  s i m p l y  
went home, neither taking part in the arrest nor trying to save or 
warn  Leon.    Socrates  was  not  punished  for  his  disobedience.  
Perhaps, as Socrates claims, the Thirty would have killed him in 
retaliation if the regime had not been close to collapse.  Perhaps 
Socrates’  special  stature  and  association  with  Critias,  his  former 
student  and  a  leader  of  the  Thirty,  saved  him.    Or  perhaps  the 
failure to carry out an arrest was less likely to provoke retaliation 
from  the  tyrants  than  other  offenses.    One  source  suggests  that 
some  citizens  took  revenge  on  personal  enemies  by  initiating 
summary arrests during the killing spree.29  After the restoration of 
the democracy, court speakers would at times declare their clean 
record during the oligarchy by stating that in addition to not being 
members of the Council or officers under the Thirty, they also did 
not carry out any arrests.30  This suggests that citizen arrests were 
common, were regarded as particularly blameworthy, or both.  It is 
interesting that speakers generally do not state that they did not 
serve as informers; while having been an informer may have been 
considered morally blameworthy, informers do not appear to have 
been considered part of the oligarchy in the same way that those 
who  carried  out  arrests  were.    It  seems  that  while  it  was 
understood that many informers testified under the true threat of 
death, there was a suspicion that at least some of the citizens who 
carried out arrests initiated the action themselves or could have 
avoided carrying out the Thirty’s orders. 
 
28 PLATO,  Apology  of  Socrates,  in  THE  TRIAL  AND  EXECUTION  OF  SOCRATES 5 7  
(Thomas C. Brickhouse & Nicholas D. Smith eds., 2002) [Pl. Apol. 32c-d]. 
29 See LYSIAS, For the Soldier, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 95, 96–100 (detailing a 
soldier’s argument that he was being accused for nothing more than enmity) [Lys. 
9]. 
30 See id. at 98–99 (demonstrating that the lack of participation in public office 
could be used as evidence supporting innocence) [Lys. 9.13–17]; see, e.g., LYSIAS, 
On a  C h a r g e  o f  Ov e r t h r o wi n g  t h e  De mo c r a c y ,   in  LYSIAS,  supra  note  6,  at  260,  265 
(defending against allegations of oligarchic sympathies by stating that “during the 
oligarchy nobody suffered summary arrest at my hands, none of my enemies was 
punished, and none of my friends was rewarded”) [Lys. 25.15]. LANNI.DOC  1/9/11  7:45 PM 
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2.4.   Involuntary Exile, Massacre at Eleusis, and the Rise of the 
Democratic Opposition 
At  some  point  after  the  extra-judicial  murders  of  those 
excluded  from  the  3000,  the  Thirty  took  the  additional  step  of 
banning everyone excluded from the 3000 from the urban center 
and  confiscating  their  property.31  M o s t  o f  t h e  d i s p l a c e d  
individuals settled in the Piraeus, the port and commercial center 
of Athens; some may have gone into exile.32 
By this point, an opposition force made up of a small number 
of citizens and a larger group of mercenaries and resident aliens 
had formed.33  When the resistance won a number of victories, the 
Thirty became nervous and decided to take the village of Eleusis, a 
town  within  Athens’  territory,  as  a  possible  refuge.    Xenophon 
describes in detail how the Thirty murdered the male inhabitants 
in order to take control over the town.34  The cavalry ordered a 
mandatory registration of male Eleusinians under the pretense of 
determining how large a garrison to leave in the town.35  After each 
man registered, he was ordered to walk out the city gate, where 
each was arrested and brought to Athens.36  Xenophon continues: 
On the following day they summoned to the Odeum the 
hoplites who were on the roll and the cavalry also.  Then 
Critias [one of the Thirty] rose and said:  “We, gentlemen,” . 
. . “are establishing this government no less for you than for 
ourselves.  Therefore, even as you will share in honours, so 
also you must share in the dangers.  Therefore you must 
 
31 See LYSIAS, On a Charge of Overthrowing the Democracy, in LYSIAS, supra note 
6,  at  260,  267  (recounting  the  expulsion  of  other citizens  from  the  town) [Lys. 
25.22]; XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 145 (describing the evictions mandated by the 
Thirty  as  one  of  the  expansions  of  the  Thirty’s  power  after  the  death  of 
Theramenes) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.1]. 
32 See WOLPERT, supra note 5, at 18 (discussing how those not enrolled in the 
Three Thousand, fled to Piraeus to escape the tyranny of the Thirty).  Compare 
DIODORUS, supra note 2, at 103–05 (stating that the Thirty transferred citizens with 
no  political  rights  to  Piraeus  while  others  were  exiled)  [Diod.  14.32.4]  with 
XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 145 (noting that the exiled fled to Piraeus) [Xen. Hell. 
2.4.1]. 
33 See KRENTZ, supra note 5, at 83–84 (detailing the composition of the men at 
Phyle: about 100 were Athenians, 300 were mercenaries, and 300 were foreigners). 
34 For a detailed description of the Thirty’s strategy to take control of Eleusis, 
see XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 147–49 [Xen. Hell. 2.4.8–10]. 
35 Id. at 147 [Xen. Hell. 2.4.8]. 
36 Id. at 147–49 [Xen. Hell. 2.4.8–10]. LANNI.DOC  1/9/11  7:45 PM 
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vote the condemnation of the Eleusinians who have been 
seized,  that  you  may  have  the  same  hopes  and  fears  as 
we.”37 
Those present were then instructed to vote in the open, in the 
presence of both the Thirty and the armed Spartan guards who had 
been  requested  to  help  the  oligarchy  keep  control  of  Athens.38  
Nearly the entire male population of Eleusis was executed in this 
manner.    The  Thirty  also  massacred  the  inhabitants  of  Salamis, 
though our sources do not report how the murders were carried 
out or whether a similar vote was arranged.39 
When the opposition forces approached the Piraeus, many of 
the citizens excluded from the city, as well as metics, foreigners, 
and even slaves joined the fight.40  The rebels routed the Thirty in 
Piraeus, killing two of their leaders, including Critias.  Following 
this defeat, the 3000 met in Athens and voted to replace the Thirty 
with a board of Ten; the deposed members of the Thirty settled in 
Eleusis.41  As the opposition grew in strength and threatened to 
attack the city, the oligarchic leaders in the city asked Sparta to 
 
37 XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 149 (footnotes omitted) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.9]. 
38 Xenophon and Aristotle offer very different accounts of when the Spartan 
garrison was called in.  According to Xenophon (2.3.14) they were called in very 
early in the reign of the Thirty, while Aristotle (37.2) states that they did not arrive 
until much later, after the Thirty was seriously threatened.  ARISTOTLE, supra note 
2, at 179 [Ar. Ath. Pol. 37.2]; XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 119 [Xen. Hell. 2.3.14]. 
39 See, e.g., DIODORUS, supra note 2, at 103–05 (stating that the Thirty killed the 
Eleusians  and  Salaminians  for  siding  with  the  exiles)  [Diod.  14.32.4];  see  also 
LYSIAS,  Against  Agoratus, i n   LYSIAS,  supra  note  6,  at  137,  148  (discussing  the 
massacres  in  Salamis  and  Eleusis  generally)  [Lys.  13.44];  LYSIAS,  Against 
Eratosthenes, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 113, 126 (describing how three hundred 
citizens in Salamis and Eleusis were condemned to death “by a collective vote”) 
[Lys. 12.52]. 
40 See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 180–82 (discussing how opposing forces 
gained strength as all Greeks joined their side) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 38.3, 40.2]; DIODORUS, 
supra note 2, at 107 (explaining that exiles from around all of Greece flocked to the 
Piraeus “to lay siege to the city”) [Diod. 14.33.4]; XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 159 
(noting the diversity of men among the opposition forces) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.25]. 
41 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 179 (“The men from the city returned after 
the battle, met in the Agora the next day, and deposed the Thirty and elected ten 
citizens  with  full  powers  to  bring  the  war  to  an  end.”)  [Ar.  Ath.  Pol.  38.1]; 
XENOPHON,  supra  note  4,  at  157–59  (describing  the  process  which  led  to  the 
deposition  of  the  Thirty  and  the  election  of  the  ten,  which  consisted  of  one 
member from each of the ten tribes) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.23–24]. LANNI.DOC  1/9/11  7:45 PM 
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send reinforcements.42  The Spartans at first blockaded the Piraeus, 
but then changed strategy and the Spartan commander Pausanias 
negotiated a reconciliation agreement under which the democracy 
was restored.43 
2.5. Forms of Collaboration 
What were the crimes committed under the Thirty and who 
committed them?  Between September 404 and May 403 the Thirty 
Tyrants executed approximately 1500 Athenians and drove out of 
the city and confiscated the property of thousands more.44  Those 
bearing the most guilt for this violence were, of course, the senior 
public officials: the Thirty themselves, plus the so-called Eleven, 
who were the magistrates charged with carrying out executions.  
However,  responsibility  was  widespread,  in  part  because  of  the 
Thirty’s deliberate strategy of implicating others.45  Members of the 
Council  sent  countless  innocents  to  their  deaths.    Some  citizens 
gave testimony that led to executions, often to save their own lives.  
Other citizens arrested men and handed them over to the Eleven to 
be killed without trial.  Some of these citizens made these arrests 
under threat of death and some made them on their own initiative.  
The  cavalry  arrested  the  men  of  Eleusis,  and  the  entire  armed 
forces  voted  to  condemn  them.  More  broadly,  much  of  the 
 
42 See XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 161 (detailing this request for assistance and 
explaining Lysander’s plan to blockade the men in Piraeus by land and by sea in 
order to induce a rapid surrender) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.28]. 
43 See  XENOPHON,  supra  note  4,  at  161–71  (discussing  the  circumstances 
ultimately  leading  to  Pausanias’  change  in  strategy  to  restore  democracy  in 
Athens) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.28–43]. 
44 See AESCHINES, Against Ctesiphon, in AESCHINES, supra note 2, at 159, 244 
(noting that more than fifteen hundred citizens were killed without trial) [Aesch. 
3.235]; ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 178 (detailing the widespread attacks on the 
citizenry which resulted in more than fifteen hundred deaths) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 35.4]; 
DIODORUS,  supra  note  2,  at  23  (stating  that  in  addition  to  executing  ordinary 
citizens,  the  Thirty  also  killed  wealthy  citizens  for  their  property  and 
appropriated  the  property  of  citizens  who  fled  to  protect  themselves)  [Diod. 
14.5.6]; see also ISOCRATES, Areopagiticus, in ISOCRATES I, supra note 2, at 182, 197 
(contrasting the restraint of the exiles with the extensive violence of the Thirty) 
[Isoc. 7.67]. 
45 See, e.g., PLATO, supra note 28, at 57 (“[W]hen the oligarchy came to power, 
the Thirty summoned me and four others to the Rotunda and ordered us to bring 
Leon from Salamis to be put to death.”) [Pl. Apol. 32c]; XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 
149  (describing  how  the  Thirty  forced  the  hoplites  and  cavalry  of  Eleusis  to 
condemn to death certain male Eleusian citizens so that they “may have the same 
hopes and fears as [them]”) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.9]. LANNI.DOC  1/9/11  7:45 PM 
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population stayed in the city and did not object during the unjust 
judicial  murders  and  massacres  of  hundreds  of  citizens  without 
trial.  The overall picture is one of widespread collaboration, or at 
least acquiescence, by the citizenry in mass violence orchestrated 
by a small but highly intimidating leadership. 
3.  “RECONCILIATION” 
The Athenians remembered the reconciliation agreement as a 
complete success,46 an act of generosity and unity that set Athens 
apart from other city-states.47  One orator told the Athenian jury, 
“the whole of Greece regards you as very generous and sensible 
men, because you didn’t devote yourselves to revenge for the past, 
but to the preservation of the city and the unity of its citizens.”48  
The  reconciliation  agreement  was  successful  in  the  sense  that 
Athens avoided the widespread bloodshed that often accompanied 
civil wars in other Greek states and established a stable democracy 
that  endured  for  the  remainder  of  Athens’  history  as  an 
independent state.  But while Athenians on opposite sides of the 
conflict found a way to live and govern together in the restored 
democracy,  our  sources  reveal  that  private,  human  resentment 
over  actions  taken  during  the  oligarchy  remained  strong  for 
decades after the end of the civil war. 
3.1.   The Terms of the Reconciliation Agreement 
The terms of the reconciliation agreement were less a product 
of generosity than of military necessity.  Although the democrats 
had gained the upper hand at the time of the settlement, the arrival 
 
46 See ANDOCIDES, On the Mysteries, in ANTIPHON AND ANDOCIDES 99, 137–38 
(Michael  Gagarin  &  Douglas  M.  MacDowell  trans.,  1998)  (showing  that  the 
Athenian  reconciliation  was  regarded  as  a  “satisfactory  settlement  of  mutual 
disagreements”) [Andoc. 1.140]; ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 182 (discussing how 
well the Athenians managed their affairs post-reconciliation) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 40.3]; 
ISOCRATES, Special Plea Against Callimachus, in ISOCRATES I, supra note 2, at 96, 104 
(arguing that Athens exhibited a superior intelligence in handling post-war civil 
strife)  [Isoc.  18.31–32];  XENOPHON,  supra n o t e  4 ,  a t  1 7 1  ( r e c o g n i z i n g  t h a t  t h e  
Athenians chose not to remember past grievances) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.43]. 
47 See ANDOCIDES, On the Mysteries, in ANTIPHON AND ANDOCIDES, supra note 
46, at 99, 137–38 (reaffirming the attitude of generosity and sensibility exhibited by 
the Athenians following the reconciliation) [Andoc. 1.140]; ISOCRATES, Special Plea 
Against Callimachus, in ISOCRATES I, supra note 2, at 96, 104 (arguing that Athens 
exhibited a superior intelligence in handling post-war civil strife) [Isoc. 18.31–32.]. 
48 ANDOCIDES, On the Mysteries, in ANTIPHON AND ANDOCIDES, supra note 46, at 
99, 137 [Andoc. 1.140]. LANNI.DOC  1/9/11  7:45 PM 
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of Spartan forces to bolster the oligarchs threatened the democrats’ 
success.49  P a u s a n i a s ,  t h e  S p a r t a n  c o m m a n d e r ,  p r e s i d e d  o v e r  a n  
agreement that guaranteed the restoration of the democracy but 
also t r e a t e d  t h e  o l i g a r c h s  a n d  t h e i r  s u p p o r t e r s  w i t h  r e l a t i v e  
leniency. 
The highest officials of the oligarchy—the Thirty, the Ten who 
succeeded the Thirty, the Eleven who carried out executions, and 
the governors of the Piraeus—were given the option of forfeiting 
their Athenian citizenship to live autonomously in the village of 
Eleusis with any of their supporters who wished to join them.50  
Remarkably,  the  agreement  not  only  gave  the  former  oligarchs 
control  over  the  village  whose  men  they  had  massacred;  it  also 
forced current inhabitants of Eleusis to sell their land if one of the 
settlers wished to buy it.51  This experiment in splitting Athens into 
two autonomous settlements was short-lived:  when the Athenians 
learned  two  years  later  that  the  former  oligarchs  were  hiring 
mercenaries,  the  Athenians  killed  the  opposing  generals  and 
reintegrated Eleusis into a single Athenian state.52 
The  top  oligarchic  officials  who  did  not  want  to  relocate  to 
Eleusis  were  permitted  to  remain  in  Athens  provided  they 
underwent an euthuna, a trial-like accounting of their conduct in 
office, and accepted any punishment meted out by the court.53  The 
accounting was not an extraordinary transitional justice institution 
but the standard procedure faced by all outgoing officials under 
the  democracy  both  before  and  after  the  revolution.    The  only 
adjustment made to the procedure was that the oligarchs were to 
be judged not by a jury drawn from all adult male citizens but 
from citizens with taxable property,54 a form, as one scholar has 
 
49 See  XENOPHON,  supra  note  4,  at  171  (noting  the  difficulty  caused  by  the 
Spartan troops prior to the eventual success of the agreement) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.43]. 
50 See  ARISTOTLE,  supra  note  2,  at  180–81  (discussing  the  conditions 
surrounding the option to move to Eleusis) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 39–40.1]. 
51 See id. (relaying how land was transferred between settlers) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 
39.3]. 
52 See XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 171 (showing that the strategic hiring of 
mercenaries by the oligarchs elicited a definitive response from the Athenians) 
[Xen. Hell. 2.4.43]. 
53 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 181 (discussing how members of the Thirty 
and  the  Eleven  and  the  ten  governors  of  Peiraeus  would  be  “immune  from 
prosecution once they had submitted to the euthuna”) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 39.6]. 
54 See id. (noting that the jury for the euthuna of the governors of Piraeus were 
the citizens of Piraeus and the jury for the euthuna of the others who held office in 
the city was limited to  citizens with taxable property ) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 39.6]. LANNI.DOC  1/9/11  7:45 PM 
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put it, of “loser’s justice.”55  The procedure appears to have been as 
even-handed in practice as advertised:  at least one member of the 
Thirty appears to have consented to, and passed, an accounting,56 
and the Constitution of the Athenians tells us that several of members 
of the Board of Ten who ruled at the end of the oligarchy passed 
their accountings.57 
Everyone below the top officials was granted amnesty under 
the  agreement.58  T h e  A s s e m b l y  s w o r e  a n  o a t h ,  me  mnesikakein, 
which is sometimes translated as “not to remember past wrongs,” 
but is more accurately (though less literally) translated as “not to 
bear  a  grudge”  or  “to  cancel  past  grievances.”59  T h e  a m n e s t y  
banned  physical  retaliation  and  lawsuits  against  those  who 
committed crimes during the oligarchy.  Each  year,  the  Council 
swore  not  to  accept  summary  arrests  that  violated  the  amnesty, 
and jurors similarly swore to uphold the law and not to bear a 
grudge  for  events  under  the  Thirty.60    The  Amnesty  had  one 
 
55 ELSTER, supra note 3, at 22. 
56 See LYSIAS, Against Theomnestus for Defamation, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at  
101, 110 (stating that someone brought a homicide charge against one or more 
members  of  the  Thirty  in  the  year  399/398,  which  suggests  that  at  least  one 
oligarch  passed  his  accounting  and  remained  in  Athens)  [Lys.  10.31];  see  also 
KRENTZ,  supra  note  5,  at  122  (explaining  that  one  scholar  has  argued  that  the 
passages in Against Eratosthenes suggest that there was more than one defendant 
at this accounting, however, as Krentz points out, “the plural references can be 
understood  as  Lysias’  attempt  to  condemn  by  association”);  LYSIAS, A g a i n s t  
Eratosthenes, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 113, 115 (noting the prosecution speech at 
the accounting of another member of the Thirty, Eratosthenes, survives although 
the specific outcome of the accounting is unknown) [Lys. 12]. 
57 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 180 (explaining how Rhinon and his friends, 
members of the Board of Ten, passed their accounting under the democracy) [Ar. 
Ath. Pol. 38.4]. 
58 See ANDOCIDES, On the Mysteries, in ANTIPHON AND ANDOCIDES, supra note 
46, at 99, 137–38 (reiterating positive attitudes toward the reconciliation, as well as 
the fact that all collaborators below the Thirty and the Eleven were granted total 
amnesty)  [Andoc.  1.140];  ARISTOTLE,  supra  note  2,  at  181  (recognizing  that 
complete amnesty was given to everyone except the Thirty) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 39.6]. 
59 See E DWIN  CARAWAN,  RHETORIC  AND  THE  LAW  OF  DRACO 1 3 0 –31  (1998) 
(examining the use of the phrase in other Greek treaties and agreements); see also 
NICOLE  LORAUX,  THE  DIVIDED  CITY:  ON  MEMORY A N D  FORGETTING  IN  ANCIENT 
ATHENS 149–52 (2002) (interpreting me mnesikakein); David Cohen, The Rhetoric of 
Justice:  Strategies  of  Reconciliation  and  Revenge  in  the  Restoration  of  Athenian 
Democracy in 403 BC, 42 EUR. J. SOC. 335, 339 (2001) (noting that one of the possible 
translations of me mnesikakein is “not to hold a grudge”). 
60 See ANDOCIDES, On the Mysteries, in ANTIPHON AND ANDOCIDES, supra note 
46,  at  99,  125 ( d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  o a t h  t a k e n  t o  grant  amnesty  for  conduct  which 
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exception:  charges of homicide and wounding for actions taken 
during the oligarchy could proceed provided that the defendant 
killed  or  wounded  “with  his  own  hand”  (autocheir).61  B u t  t h i s  
exception,  probably  included  for  reasons  of  religious  pollution, 
had  little  practical  effect.    Nearly  all  of  those  responsible  for 
criminal violence committed during the civil war were shielded by 
the Amnesty because the actual executions were committed by the 
Board of Eleven, who were excluded from the Amnesty and all of 
whom,  presumably,  fled  to  Eleusis  or  into  exile  after  the 
reconciliation.  After the reintegration of Eleusis in 401/400, the 
Amnesty  was  reaffirmed62 t o  m a k e  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  t e r m s  o f  t h e  
Amnesty extended to those who had relocated to Eleusis.63 
3.2. Implementation and Resistance 
Aside from returning the land that had been confiscated,64 the 
reconciliation  agreement  offered  little  to  those  who  had  been 
victimized  by  the  Thirty.    Not  surprisingly,  some  Athenians 
resisted complying with the Amnesty.  We are told of at least one 
former informant who, though covered by the Amnesty, opted to 
 
perpetrators,  to  remain  in  Athens,  if  they  submitted  to,  and  passed,  an 
examination of their conduct in office) [Andoc. 1.90–91]. 
61 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 181 (noting the lack of amnesty given to 
those who had killed another person with their own hands) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 39.5–6]. 
62 See id. (showing that the Amnesty was in effect prior to the fall of Eleusis) 
[Ar.  Ath.  Pol.  39.6];  see  also  ANDOCIDES,  On  the  Mysteries,  in  ANTIPHON  AND 
ANDOCIDES, supra note 46, at 99, 125 (supporting the conception that the Amnesty 
was part of the reconciliation and that it was reaffirmed after the fall of Eleusis) 
[Andoc. 1.90–91].  But see XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 171 (presenting a narrative 
that  supports  the  idea  that  the  Amnesty  was  only  instituted  after  the  fall  of 
Eleusis)  [Xen.  Hell.  2.4.43].    See  generally  LOENING,  supra  note  5,  at  26–28 
(discussing this reconciliation debate in greater detail). 
63 See KRENTZ, supra note 5, at 122 (arguing that those in Eleusis excluded 
from the Amnesty went into voluntary exile); LOENING, supra note 5, at 116–17 
(noting that those in Eleusis who were excluded from the Amnesty, such as the 
Thirty  and  the  Eleven,  presumably  went  into  voluntary  exile  to  escape 
punishment).    We  are  not  aware  of  any  member  of  the  Thirty  or  the  Eleven 
returning to Athens after the fall of Eleusis. 
64 See  LYSIAS,  Against  Hippotherses,  in  LYSIAS,  supra n o t e  6 ,  a t  366,  368 
(describing  the  complex  rules  in  place  under t h e  r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  a g r e e m e n t  
surrounding  the  return  of  confiscated  real  property  as  well  as  movables a n d  
suggesting that payment would often have to be made for the recuperation of 
confiscated property) [Lys. 7]; see also LOENING, supra note 5, at 51–52 (discussing 
this property compensation process). LANNI.DOC  1/9/11  7:45 PM 
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go into exile out of fear of retaliation.65  And we hear of one man 
who  immediately  violated  the  Amnesty,  probably  by  taking 
physical vengeance,66 prompting one of Athens’ leaders to make an 
example of him by having the Council execute him without trial.67  
Aristotle  suggests  that  this  measure  successfully  deterred  those 
intent on private vengeance.68  Attempts to bring private suits in 
violation of the Amnesty prompted the Athenians to create a new 
procedure, the paragraphe, which allowed a defendant to challenge 
the legality of a prosecution and imposed a financial penalty on the 
prosecutor if the case was thrown out.69  And we know of a few 
attempts, at least one of which appears to have been successful,70 to 
use creative legal arguments to get around the Amnesty and hold 
informants responsible for judicial murders committed under the 
Thirty.71  But despite some resistance, it appears that the Amnesty 
was generally honored in the sense that there appears to have been 
very little violent retaliation and very few prosecutions brought for 
the  thousands  of  confiscations,  murders,  and  other  crimes 
committed under the Thirty.72 
 
65 See LYSIAS, Against Andocides, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 61, 74 (comparing 
Andocides to an informer under the Thirty who may have been tracked down and 
killed by his enemies in Athens) [Lys. 6.45]. 
66 See  CARAWAN,  supra  note  59,  at  130–31  (discussing  an  example  where 
Archinus arrested an unnamed citizen who violated the Amnesty and had him 
put to death without trial). 
67 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 181–82 (stating that Archinus stopped some 
of the returning democrats from killing their enemies) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 40.2].  Nepos 
also states that Thrasybulus stopped some of the returning democrats from killing 
their enemies.  See CORNELIUS NEPOS, Thrasybulus, in CORNELIUS NEPOS 92, 99 (John 
C. Rolfe trans., 1984) [Thrasyb. 3.3]. 
68 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 182 (suggesting that the execution examples 
prevented Athenians from taking both private and public revenge) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 
40.2–3]. 
69 See ISOCRATES, Special Plea Against Callimachus, in ISOCRATES I, supra note 2, 
at 97, 97–98 (describing the introduction of the paragraphe as a measure to stop 
prosecutions that violated the Amnesty) [Isoc. 18.2–3]. 
70 See LYSIAS, Against Agoratus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 137, 150–51 (stating 
that the informer, Menestratus, was tried and condemned) [Lys. 13.55–57]. 
71 See id. at 150 (describing the successful prosecution of  of Menestratus for 
being an informer) [Lys. 13.55–57]. 
72 See XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 171 (stating that the demos abided by its 
oaths) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.43]; see also ANDOCIDES, On the Mysteries, in ANTIPHON AND 
ANDOCIDES, supra note 46, at 99, 125–26 (stating that Meletus had immunity for his 
arrest  of  Leon  of  Salamis  due  to  the  reconciliation)  [Andoc.  1.94];  ISOCRATES, 
Special Plea Against Callimachus, in ISOCRATES I, supra note 2, at 97, 102-03 (citing a 
case in which the defendant presented no defense other than immunity, based on 
the Amnesty, and was acquitted, and describing how two powerful individuals LANNI.DOC  1/9/11  7:45 PM 
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But was it that easy?  Very seldom, and never before and after 
in the ancient world, has a bloodletting so great been followed by 
an amnesty so generous.  What is striking about the amnesty is that 
the Athenians stuck to it long after the Spartan threat receded and 
despite  the  fact  that  many  victims  of  the  Thirty  harbored 
resentment decades later.73  How did this happen? 
4.  THE ROLE OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN RECONCILIATION 
In  this  section,  I  explore  how  Athenian  legal  institutions 
fostered reconciliation and a peaceful transition to democracy.  I 
argue that Athens’ unique legal and political culture permitted the 
terms of the reconciliation agreement to be implemented in a way 
that promoted unity and social solidarity while it also recognized 
the need to avoid impunity for collaborators at the local or private 
level.74  First, in the generation following the war, speeches made 
in the Athenian courts helped cultivate reconciliation by creating a 
collective  memory  of  the  “misfortunes”75 t h a t  d o w n p l a y e d  t h e  
extent  of  collaboration  and  extolled  Athens  for  the  generosity 
embodied in the Amnesty.76  Second, through the use of character 
evidence in unrelated cases and challenges to incoming officials, 
the  Athenian  courts  provided  some  measure  of  individualized 
accountability at the private level, while also encouraging former 
collaborators to make a public proclamation of their allegiance to 
the  democracy.    Finally,  the  highly  participatory  nature o f  
Athenian  civic  institutions—not  just  courts,  but  also  polis-wide 
 
refrained from bringing suit to recover money lost during the oligarchy because of 
the amnesty) [Isoc. 18.22–23]. 
73 See LYSIAS, Against Euandrus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 271, 277 (challenging 
a candidate to the archonship by referring to his conduct during the oligarchy) 
[Lys. 26.13–15]. 
74 In  this  way,  Athenian  transitional  justice  mechanisms  were  not 
epiphenomena but instead contributed to the success of the reconciliation.  See  
TEITEL, supra note 2, at 3–9 (arguing against the view that “[j]ustice seeking in 
[modern transitional] periods is fully epiphenomenal and best explained in terms 
of the balance of power”); see also Posner and Vermeule, supra note 3, at 770–77 
(providing modern examples of transitional justice mechanisms “as causal factors 
that may contribute to or undermine the success of a transition”). 
75 See ANDOCIDES, On the Mysteries, in ANTIPHON AND ANDOCIDES, supra note 
46, at 99, 137 (referring to the civil war obliquely as “the misfortunes”) [Andoc. 
1.140]. 
76 Excellent  discussions  of  how  Athenian  court  rhetoric  constructed  a 
collective memory of the civil war include WOLPERT, supra note 5, at 75–99 and 
Cohen, supra note 59. LANNI.DOC  1/9/11  7:45 PM 
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and local deliberative assemblies—helped repair local relationships 
by  forcing  individuals  on  opposite  sides  of  the  conflict  to  work 
closely together. 
A few words of background on the Athenian court system may 
be helpful here.77  There were no lawyers or professional judges in 
ancient  Athens;  with  few  exceptions,  litigants  were  required  to 
deliver their own speeches to the jury.78  Each Athenian litigant 
was allotted a fixed amount of time to present his case.  Although a 
magistrate  chosen  by  lot  presided  over  each  popular  court,  the 
magistrate did not interrupt the speaker for any reason or permit 
others  to  raise  legal  objections.  T h e  m a g i s t r a t e  d i d  n o t  e v e n  
instruct the jury as to the laws relevant to the case.  Cases in the 
popular courts were heard by juries of adult male citizens chosen 
by  lot  and  generally  ranged f r o m  2 0 1  t o  5 0 1  i n  s i z e .   A  s i m p l e  
majority vote of the jury, taken without deliberation, determined 
the outcome of the trial.  No reasons for the verdict were given, 
and there was no provision for appeal. 
Litigants  regularly  introduced  evidence—such  as  character 
evidence relating to the litigant’s military service or how he treated 
his  parents—that  modern  courts  would  deem  irrelevant  and/or 
prejudicial.79  E vidence  of a  l i t i g a n t ’ s  c o l l a b o r a t i o n  o r  r e s i s t a n c e  
during the civil war could influence jury verdicts in part because 
Athenian jurors did not feel constrained to strictly apply the statute 
under which a case was brought.80  The treatment of law in the 
surviving speeches is consistent with Aristotle’s characterization of 
laws  as  a  form  of  evidence,  similar  to  contracts  and  witness 
 
77 See generally LANNI, supra note 13, at 31–40 (outlining the structure of the 
Athenian legal system). 
78 A litigant could donate some of his time to another speaker.  For an in-
depth  study  of  the  use  of  supporting  speakers  in  Athenian  courts,  see  LENE 
RUBINSTEIN, LITIGATION AND COOPERATION: SUPPORTING SPEAKERS IN THE COURTS OF 
CLASSICAL ATHENS (2000). 
79 See g e n e r a l l y   LANNI,  supra  note  13,  at  41–74  (discussing  extra-legal 
arguments brought up in Athenian courts). 
80 For a more detailed discussion, see generally id.  Although others have 
reached  a  similar  conclusion,  for  example  MATTHEW  R.  CHRIST,  THE  LITIGIOUS 
ATHENIAN 193–224 (1998) (“The laws are a splendid thing; but a man who looks 
too closely to the laws is clearly a sykophant [sic].”) (quoting Menander).  Some 
disagree.  See, e.g., P.J. Rhodes, Keeping to the Point, in THE LAW AND THE COURTS IN 
ANCIENT GREECE 137 (Edward M. Harris & Lene Rubinstein eds., 2004) (arguing 
for a more qualified notion of relevance in Athenian litigation). LANNI.DOC  1/9/11  7:45 PM 
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testimony,  rather  than  as  a  decisive  guide  to  a  verdict.81  T h e  
Athenian laws were inscribed on stone stelai in various public areas 
of Athens.  Litigants were responsible for finding and quoting any 
laws  they  thought  helped  their  case,  though  there  was  no 
obligation to explain the relevant laws.  Rather than focusing on 
the elements of the particular charge at issue and applying them to 
the facts of the case, Athenian litigants would sometimes cite an 
array of laws that did not govern the charges in the case,82 and on 
occasion  would  not  consider  it  relevant  to  discuss—or  even 
mention—the law under which the suit was brought.83  In many 
cases, the primary purpose of the relevant law may have been to 
set out a procedure for bringing a case to court.  The jury then 
attempted  to  arrive  at  a  just  outcome  for  the  broadly  defined 
dispute. 
Before  discussing  the  three  mechanisms  through  which  the 
courts  fostered  reconciliation  in  more  detail,  I  would  like  to 
emphasize one broader point:  the Athenian legal system was able 
to  perform  these  functions  without a n y  s i g n i f i c a n t  c h a n g e  i n  i t s  
culture or design—a continuity that gave it a distinct advantage 
over  modern  institutions  charged  with  dispensing  transitional 
justice.  T h e  b r o a d  n o t i o n  o f  r e l e v a n c e  a n d  t h e  c o n t e x t u a l i z e d  
 
81 See ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 102 (George A. 
Kennedy trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2007) (discussing five items—laws, witnesses, 
contracts, tortures and oaths—that factor into judicial rhetoric) [Ar. Rhet. 1.15]. 
82 Speakers sometimes cited laws to bolster their portrayal of the character of 
the parties.  See, e.g., Michael de Brauw, “Listen to the Law Themselves”: Citations of 
Laws and Portrayal of Character in Attic Oratory, 97.2 CLASSICAL J. 161 (2001–2002) 
(exploring the citation of law in Athens as a means to portray character).  Speakers 
also cited the law to give the general impression that the laws supported their 
position.  See, e.g., C. Carey, Nomos in Attic Rhetoric and Oratory, 116 J. HELLENIC 
STUD. 3 3 ,  3 4  ( 1 9 9 6 )  ( a r g u i n g  t h a t  l i t i g a n t s  s o m e t i m e s  c i t e  m u l t i p l e  l aw  of 
questionable relevance “to overwhelm the jury with a seemingly compelling array 
of legal support”).  Ford provides a case study of the use of law in Aeschines’ 
Against  Timarchus.  H e  n o t e s  t h a t  t h e  d i scussion  of  the  law  at  issue,  which 
accounts for only one-sixth of the speech (1.28–32), is surrounded by a number of 
laws irrelevant to the charge but useful in constructing an image of the education 
and moral character of a proper orator that can be contrasted with the record and 
character  of  the  speaker’s  opponent.    Andrew  Ford,  Reading  Homer  from  the 
Rostrum:  Poems  and  Laws  in A e s c h i n e s’  Against  Timarchus,  in  PERFORMANCE 
CULTURE AND ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY 231, 241 (Simon Goldhill & Robin Osborne 
eds., 1999). 
83 See, e.g., LYSIAS, Against Nicomachus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 296 (omitting 
any citation to a law) [Lys. 30]. LANNI.DOC  1/9/11  7:45 PM 
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approach to adjudication characteristic of Athenian courts84 made 
them a more effective forum for the creation of collective memory 
than modern war crimes tribunals.  In modern tribunals, the desire 
of  prosecutors  or  judges  to  use  the  trial  to  create  a  shared 
understanding  of  the  causes  of  ‘administrative  massacres’—
atrocities  perpetrated  with  the  assistance  of  the  modern 
bureaucratic state—is inevitably constrained by the law’s narrow 
focus  on  the  conduct  and  responsibility  of  the  individual 
defendants.85  A t h e n i a n  c o u r t  p r o c e d u r e s ,  b y  c o n t r a st,  could 
comfortably accommodate these non-traditional goals.  Moreover, 
in the modern context, the creation of special transitional justice 
procedures—whether  they  are  courts,  truth  commissions,  or 
procedures  for  administrative  penalties—inevitably  raises 
questions  of  legitimacy  on  two  grounds.    First,  they  are  often 
perceived  to  be  politicized  because  they  are  ad  hoc  institutions 
designed to address a specific political crisis.86  Second, modern 
transitional  justice  institutions  subject  individuals  to  procedures 
and, on occasion, substantive legal standards that did not exist at 
the time the prosecuted conduct occurred.87  By contrast, Athens’ 
legal  response  to  the  atrocities  of  the  Thirty  utilized  only  pre-
existing  democratic  legal  procedures  precisely  because  these 
procedures could accommodate transitional justice goals.  In this 
way, “transitional justice” in Athens was not a departure from but 
rather an integral part of the restored democratic order. 
Was Athenian legal culture the most important element in the 
success of the reconciliation?  It is impossible to prove definitively, 
but it is worth pointing out that the other obvious, potential factors 
cannot  completely  explain  Athens’  peaceful  transition.    Political 
 
84 See  generally  LANNI,  supra  note  13,  at  41–74  (describing  the  use  and 
relevance of extra-legal arguments within the Athenian legal system). 
85 See Martti Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, 6 MAX PLANCK 
Y.B. U.N. L. 1, 13 (2002) (“[T]he meaning of historical events often exceeds the 
intentions  or  actions  of  particular  individuals  and  can  be  grasped  only  by 
attention to structural causes, . . . or a broad institutional logic through which the 
actions by individuals create social effects.”); see also MINOW, supra note 1, at 46–47 
(“[T]he focus on select individuals cannot tell the complex  connections among 
people that make massacres and genocides possible.”). 
86 See,  e.g.,  MINOW,  supra  note  1,  at  30–31  (describing  the  contemporary 
criticisms of the International Tribunal’s actions during the Nuremberg trials). 
87 See id. (discussing the problem of retroactivity at the Nuremberg, Bosnia 
and  Rwanda t r i b u n a l s );  see  also  TEITEL,  supra  note  2,  at  11–26  (exploring t h e  
meaning  of  “the  rule  of  law” w i t h i n  s o c i e t i e s  u n d e r g o i n g  p o l i t i c a l  
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scientists in the realist tradition often argue that transitional justice 
measures  are  epiphenomenal,  and  that  successful  reconciliations 
can  be  traced  to e q u i l i b r i u m  b e t w e e n  w e l l -balanced  opposing 
forces.  This explanation does not work for the Athenian case.  It is 
true that the initial settlement emerged from a stalemate between 
the rebels and the Spartan-backed oligarchs.  However, once the 
settlement had been made the Spartans quickly made their exit.  
There  was  no  balance  of  power;  the  democrats  were  firmly  in 
control and in a position to exact harsh retribution on the former 
oligarchs if they had chosen to do so.  Moreover, the picture that 
emerges  of  postwar  Athens  is  not  of  two  opposing  factions  in 
equipoise, but rather of a united restored democracy in which a 
fair number of former oligarchs played an active role.  In addition, 
although Athens faced dire economic and military danger after the 
loss of its empire and could not afford continued internal strife,88 
Thucydides provides examples of other cities in the grip of civil 
war  who  failed t o  a c t  r a t i o n a l l y ,  c ities  for  whom,  in  his  words, 
“[r]evenge  was  more  important  than  self-preservation.”89  
Similarly, the absence of racial or ethnic differences between the 
factions does distinguish Athens from many modern transitions, 
but  it  does  not  explain  why  Athens  was  more  successful  than 
other, similarly ethnically homogenous, Greek city-states that also 
experienced  civil  wars.    Finally,  some  scholars  argue  that  the 
constitutional reforms at the end of the fifth century removed the 
basis for oligarchic discontent.90  But there is no question that, at 
least  in  intellectual  circles,  many  people—Plato  being  the  most 
prominent  example—remained  dissatisfied  with  the  democracy 
and were attracted to oligarchic forms of government. 
While  we  cannot  determine  precisely  how  much  of  Athens’ 
success  can  be  attributed  to  the  discourse  in  the  courts,  we  do 
know  that  Athens  was  nearly  alone  in  avoiding  the  cycle  of 
retribution  that  afflicted  other  city-states  during  and  after  the 
Peloponnesian War.  We also know that its legal system was very 
 
88 See, e.g., OBER, supra note 2, at 98–100 (describing the dire economic and 
political situation in Athens after the war). 
89 See  THUCYDIDES,  HISTORY  OF  THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR 2 0 9  ( R e x  W a r n e r  
trans., Penguin Books 1954) (discussing the deterioration of law and order in favor 
of revenge and greed during the revolution in Corcyra) [Thuc. 3.82]. 
90 See,  e.g.,  ELSTER,  supra  note  3,  at  14–15  (describing  a  provision  in  the 
reformed constitution which promoted democratic procedures by prohibiting the 
use  of  laws  not  included  within  the  written  code  and  requiring  proposed 
revisions to the law to pass a series of discussions before the Assembly). LANNI.DOC  1/9/11  7:45 PM 
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different from any other city-state, indeed different from just about 
any  other  legal  system  the  world  has  known.    Thus  it  seems 
worthwhile to try to identify aspects of the legal system in Athens 
that may have produced this extraordinary outcome. 
4.1. Courts and Collective Memory 
Legal  procedures  following  administrative  massacres  can 
influence the society’s “collective memory” of these events, that is, 
the  community’s  shared  understanding  of  the  extent  and 
reprehensibility of the atrocities and the relative culpability of the 
different actors.91  Trials can serve as legal rituals, which, in the 
words  of  David  Garland,  “provide  a  kind  of  didactic  theatre 
through which the onlooker is taught what to feel, how to react, 
[and]  which s entiments  are  called  for.”92  W h i l e  t h e r e  i s  n o  
blueprint  for  designing  transitional  justice  institutions  that  will 
positively  influence  collective  memory,  the  twentieth  century 
offers some success stories.93  In Western Europe, for example, it 
has  been  found  that  the  collective  memory  of  the  Holocaust 
(judged from opinion surveys and textbooks) is weakest and least 
accurate in those countries that conducted few or no postwar trials 
of collaborators.94  It is important to note that a society’s collective 
memory  need  not  be  historically  “accurate”  to  generate  social 
solidarity; the siege of Masada and the denial of extensive French 
collaboration  during  World  War  II  are  examples  of  shared 
historical  fictions  that  are  thought  to  have  fostered  solidarity.95  
 
91 See, e.g., MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE LAW 2 
(1997)  (“Trials  of  those  responsible  for  large-scale  state  brutality  .  .  .  indelibly 
influence  collective  memory  of  the  events  they  judge.”);  TEITEL,  supra  note  2 
(exploring  how  “transitional  accountings” h e l p s  c o n s t r u c t  a  s t a t e ’ s  p olitical 
identity); Koskenniemi, supra note 85, at 12 (describing how past “normality” is 
politicized when seeking transitional justice). 
92 DAVID GARLAND,  PUNISHMENT  AND  MODERN SOCIETY 67 (1990) (emphasis 
added); see also OSIEL, supra note 91, at 2 (“By highlighting official brutality and 
public  complicity  .  .  .  trials  often  make  people  willing  to  reassess  their 
foundational beliefs and constitutive commitments, as few events in political life 
can do.”). 
93 See  OSIEL,  supra  note  91,  at  59–239  (describing  the  positive  impact  of 
transitional justice institutions in Germany and Japan and identifying the effective 
and ineffective components of the respective institutions). 
94 Id. at 229 (noting that the countries with the weakest collective memories—
Austria, Poland, Italy and the Netherlands—did not conduct significant postwar 
trials). 
95 Id. at 234 (describing the re-characterization of the siege of Masada as a 
means of creating a unified collective memory in Israel). LANNI.DOC  1/9/11  7:45 PM 
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Similarly, we will see that the shared memory of the reign of the 
Thirty  tyrants  constructed  in  Athenian  court  discourse  helped 
foster  unity  by  denying  the  true  extent  of  collaboration  and  by 
depicting  the  Amnesty  as  a  gesture  of  pure  benevolence  rather 
than a deal struck between evenly-matched forces.96 
Despite  the  Amnesty,  the  reign  of  the  Thirty  was  discussed 
frequently in Athenian courts in the generation after the civil war.  
At least one member of the Thirty, and several members of the Ten, 
underwent  accountings  (euthunai)  in  court  and t h e  p r o s e c u t i o n  
speech  against  Eratosthenes,  a  member  of  the  Thirty, s t i l l  
survives.97  Allegations of wrongdoing during the oligarchy arose 
frequently in examinations of incoming public officials (dokimasia); 
portions of two prosecution speeches and two defense speeches at 
these hearings have survived.98  We also have speeches involving 
two prosecutions that appear to have violated the Amnesty:  the 
prosecution of an informer for homicide, and the paragraphe speech 
challenging the legality of a private suit under the Amnesty which 
attempted to recoup money confiscated during the oligarchy.99  In 
addition  to  trials  that  centered  on  events  during  the  civil  war, 
 
96 See  Cohen,  supra  note  59,  at  348 ( “In  Athens,  after  the  restoration, 
democratic politicians realized the uses to which critiques of oligarchy could be 
put and were quick to occupy the high ground of the rule of law by appropriating 
its  rhetoric  for  their  cause.”);  WOLPERT,  supra  note  5,  at  75  (“Through  civic 
discourse,  [the  Athenians]  distanced  themselves  from  the  Thirty  while 
simultaneously  constructing  a  continuity  with  the  democracy  of  the  fifth 
century.”). 
97 See  LYSIAS,  Against  Eratosthenes, i n   LYSIAS,  supra n o t e  6 ,   at  113  (accusing 
Eratosthenes of the murder of Lysias’ brother Polemarchus) [Lys. 12]. 
98 The prosecution speeches are:  LYSIAS, Against Euandrus, in LYSIAS, supra 
note 6, at 271 (challenging Euandrus at his dokimasia for the archonship based on 
his conduct during the civil war) [Lys. 26]; LYSIAS, Against Philon, in LYSIAS, supra 
note  6,  at  308  (challenging  the  candidature  of  Philon  to  the  Council  of  Five 
Hundred) [Lys. 31].  The defense speeches are:  LYSIAS, For Mantitheus, in LYSIAS, 
supra note 6, at 177 (defending the candidate against accusations of having served 
in  the  cavalry  under  the  Thirty  during  a  dokimasia)  [Lys. 1 6 ] ;   LYSIAS,  For 
Eryximachus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 378 (defending Eryximachus against the 
allegation  that  he  supported  the  Thirty d u r i n g  t h e  c i v i l  w a r )  [Fr.  9  For 
Eryximachus]. 
99 See LYSIAS, Against Agoratus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 137 (prosecuting an 
informer, Agoratus, for murders committed under the Thirty) [Lys. 13]; ISOCRATES, 
Special Plea Against Callimachus, in ISOCRATES I, supra note 2, at 96 (offering the first 
special plea, in which the speaker defends himself against the admissibility of the 
prosecutors charge, in Athenian history) [Isoc. 18]. LANNI.DOC  1/9/11  7:45 PM 
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several court speeches discuss the reign of the Thirty, the Amnesty, 
or the conduct of litigants during the oligarchy.100 
Of course, the courts were not the only forum for constructing 
collective memory.  War memorials erected after the restoration of 
the democracy and funeral orations honoring the war’s dead (and 
praising  Athens’ s u p e r i o r  c h a r a c t er  and  form  of  government), 
which  were  delivered  annually  when  Athens  was  at  war, a l s o  
contributed to Athens’ shared understanding of the tyranny and 
the Amnesty.101  Despite the importance of drama and the arts in 
many  modern  post-conflict  societies,  Athenian  drama  was  most 
likely less significant in post-war Athens.  From early on, tragedies 
were almost always set outside Athens and were often concerned 
with mythological themes.  When Athenian tragedy did address 
contemporary politics, it only did so obliquely and ambiguously.  
Though  comedies  in  the  fifth  century,  such  as  those  of 
Aristophanes,  often  parodied  issues  of  the  day,  by  the  fourth 
century—the age of “middle comedy”—comic subjects had turned 
from political commentary to domestic life.  In any case, no forum 
could  rival  the  courts  as  a  medium  of  collective  discourse 
regarding the civil war: these courts met approximately 200 times a 
year;102 the importance of character evidence made discussion of 
 
100 See, e.g., ANDOCIDES, On the Mysteries, in ANTIPHON AND ANDOCIDES, supra 
note 46, at 99, 137 (praising the jury for focusing on preserving the city and unity 
among its citizens) [Andoc. 1.140]; LYSIAS, On the Property of Nicias’ Brother, supra 
note 6, at 195 (discussing the actions of Diognetus during the reign of the Thirty) 
[Lys.  18.10];  LYSIAS,  For t h e  D i s a b l e d  M a n ,  in  LYSIAS,  supra  note  6 ( d e n ying 
accusations relating to the defendant’s conduct during the civil war in an effort to 
receive a disability pension) [Lys. 24]; LYSIAS, On Overthrowing the Democracy, in 
LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 265 (discussing how the litigant did not take advantage of 
the chaos and punish his enemies or attempt to advantage his friends during the 
city’s defeat) [Lys. 25.15]; LYSIAS, Against Ergocles, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 291 
(challenging  the  defendant  on  his  actions w h i l e  i n  o f f i c e )  [Lys.  28.12];  LYSIAS, 
Against Nicomachus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 301 (discussing political intrigues 
that were aided by laws the defendant produced) [Lys. 30.12]; Plato, supra note 28, 
at 57 (describing the oligarchy under the Thirty) [Pl. Apol. 32 c–d]. 
101 See  WOLPERT,  supra  note  5,  at  87–90  (discussing  the  functions  of  war 
memorials  in  Athens  and  how  certain  war  memorials  became  symbols  of  the 
Athenian  democracy).    The  only  surviving  epitaphios  from  the  immediate 
postwar period is Lysias 2, which does praise the Athenians’ decision to forgo 
punishment in favor of unity.  LYSIAS, Funeral Speech, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 38–
39 [Lys. 2.60–65].  For a brilliant study of how funeral orations helped construct a 
semi-official  (and  misleading)  history  of  Athens,  see  NICOLE  LORAUX,  THE 
INVENTION OF ATHENS (1986). 
102 See MOGENS HERMAN HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF 
DEMOSTHENES: STRUCTURE, PRINCIPLES, AND IDEOLOGY 186 (J.A. Crook trans., Univ. 
of Okla. 1999) (noting that the courts met approximately 200 times per year). LANNI.DOC  1/9/11  7:45 PM 
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the  civil  war  likely  in  cases  tried  in t h e  p o s t w a r  p e r i o d ; 103 a n d  
hundreds of jurors were present at each case. 
The  discourse  in  the  courts  fostered  reconciliation  in  three 
ways, which I will discuss in turn:  (1) discrediting the oligarchy by 
depicting  the  horrors  of  the  tyranny;  (2)  constructing  unity  by 
downplaying the extent of collaboration and focusing blame on the 
Thirty;  and  (3)  praising  the  Amnesty  as  characteristic  of  the 
Athenians’ unusual wisdom and benevolence.104 
4.1.1.  Discrediting the Oligarchy 
Athenian trials publicized the crimes committed by the Thirty, 
thereby  discrediting  the  former  regime.    The  broad  notion  of 
evidence  in  Athenian  courts  permitted  prosecutors  to  reach 
beyond the specific charges against the defendant to describe the 
larger  pattern  of  tyranny.    For  example,  the  prosecution  of  an 
informant whose testimony led to a judicial murder early in the 
Thirty’s reign, includes discussion of atrocities that did not involve 
the  defendant  and  were  committed  after  the  events  in  question, 
including the massacres of Salamis and Eleusis, unjust arrests and 
executions, confiscations of property, and the expulsion of all but 
the  3000  from  the  city.105  T h e  t r i a l  a t  E r a t o s t h e n e s ’  a c c o u n t i n g  
provides  another  example.    The  prosecution  speech  includes  a 
detailed and poignant description of the murder of the speaker’s 
brother in the massacre of the resident aliens that emphasizes the 
outrageousness  of  the  Thirty,  who  had  the  audacity  to  rip  the 
earrings directly from the ears of the victim’s wife and refused to 
let the family have one of the victim’s cloaks to give him a proper 
burial.106  But the speech also includes a detailed account of how 
 
103 See LANNI, supra note 13, at 41–74 (discussing the use and influence of 
character evidence in cases heard in post war Athenian courts). 
104 See WOLPERT, supra note 5 (analyzing the discussions of the civil war by 
court  speakers  and n o t i n g  t h e  r h e t o r i c a l  s t r a t e g i e s  d i s c u s s ed  in  this  Section); 
Cohen, supra note 59 (discussing the rhetorical strategies employed in courts to 
foster reconciliation). 
105 See  LYSIAS,  Against  Agoratus,  in  LYSIAS,  supra  note  6,  at  137,  148–49 
(describing the disasters that befell Athens after Agoratus killed the men who 
went to the Council’s chamber to face trial) [Lys. 13.43–48]. 
106 See LYSIAS, Against Eratosthenes, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 113, 119 (noting 
that t h e  T h i r t y ’s  administration  of j u stice  toward  Polemarchus  began w i t h  a  
summary arrest and instructions to drink hemlock and ended with the denial of a 
customary burial) [Lys. 12.17–19]. LANNI.DOC  1/9/11  7:45 PM 
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the  oligarchy  came  to  power107 and a r eci t at i on of  t he col l ect i ve 
crimes  of  the  Thirty.108  W h i l e  t h e  s p e a k e r  o p i n e s  t h a t  m a n y  
prosecutors  would  be  required  to  describe  all  the  crimes  of  the 
Thirty,109 t h e  s p e e c h  d o e s  m a n a g e  t o  p r o v i d e  a  b r o a d -ranging 
account  of  the  crimes  committed  under  the  oligarchy  and  an 
assessment of where the primary responsibility should lie. 
These public airings in court of the oligarchy’s horrific crimes 
helped  discredit  not  only  the  former  regime,  but  also  oligarchic 
opposition to the democracy more generally.110  The repressive rule 
of  the  Thirty,  with  its  rigged  trials  and  extra-judicial  murders, 
made  it  easy  for  democrats  to  associate o l i g a r c h y  w i t h  l a w l e s s  
tyranny.    Although  oligarchic  sympathies  survived  and  even 
thrived in elite intellectual circles in the fourth century,111 oligarchy 
became a political non-starter after the civil war.  As Cohen points 
out, decades later even those too young to have been involved in 
the Thirty could be tarred with accusations of having oligarchic 
tendencies.112  T h e  p r o s e c u t o r  i n  a n  a s s a u l t  c a s e  d e r i d e s  h i s  
opponent:  “Even if he is younger than those who held power then 
[i.e., under the oligarchy], he has the character of that government.  
These  were  the  natures  that  betrayed  our  empire  to  the  enemy, 
razed the walls of our homeland, and executed fifteen hundred of 
our citizens without trial.”113 
4.1.2.  Constructing Unity 
Like many modern transitional justice legal procedures, then, 
Athenian trials helped to instill a shared sense of condemnation of 
the  crimes  committed  by  the  former  regime.    But  while  many 
 
107 See id. at 130–31 (describing Theramenes’ political strategy for depriving 
the people of hope in order to overpower them) [Lys. 12.70]. 
108 See id. at 135 (calling for a display of anger for the crimes committed by 
the Thirty) [Lys. 12. 95–96]. 
109 See  id. a t  1 3 6  ( c l o s i n g  t h e  a r g u m e n t  i n  t h e  p r o s e c u t i o n  s p e e c h  a g a i n s t  
Eratosthenes, a former member of the Thirty, and calling for a favorable verdict) 
[Lys. 12.99]. 
110 See C o h e n ,  supra  note  59,  at  347–49  (discussing  the  methods  used  to 
discredit the oligarchy). 
111 Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle are prominent examples. 
112 See C o h e n ,  supra  note  59,  at  347–49  (discussing  the  accusations  placed 
upon those who lived under the oligarchy even where they had no direct role in 
its rule). 
113 ISOCRATES, Against Lochites, in ISOCRATES I, supra note 2, at 123, 126 [Isoc. 
20.10–11]; see also Cohen, supra note 59, at 349 (discussing the lasting taint of the 
oligarchy on those who lived under its rule). LANNI.DOC  1/9/11  7:45 PM 
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modern tribunals or truth commissions seek in part to encourage 
the  broader  public  to  engage  in  self-scrutiny  and  confront  their 
own  complicity,114 A t h e n i a n  c o u r t  s p e a k e r s  d i d  n o t h i n g  o f  t h e  
kind.  In the decades after the civil war, litigants who discussed the 
violence under the oligarchy took pains to focus blame narrowly 
on the Thirty while downplaying the extent of collaboration.  This 
understanding of events was quite explicit in the speeches.  To cite 
one  stark  example:   i n  d i s c u s s i n g  t h e  m a s s a c r e  o f  t h e  m e t i c s  
(resident aliens) at the accounting of Eratosthenes, the prosecutor 
states, “[t]he rest of the Athenians [i.e. those not in the Thirty], it 
seems to me, could have a plausible excuse for what happened by 
laying  the  blame  on  the  Thirty .  .  .  .”115  B o t h  d e f e n d a n t s  a n d  
prosecutors  in  suits  involving  participation  in  the  crimes  of  the 
oligarchy  take  this  approach,  depicting  the  entire  citizenry  as 
opponents and victims of the Thirty.116  Undoubtedly the speakers 
(and their speechwriters) chose this tack because they thought that 
it  would  be  well  received  by  the  jurors.    But  the  effect  of  this 
rhetorical  strategy  was  to  help  construct  a  misleading  collective 
memory of a unified populace victimized by the tyrannical Thirty. 
Lysias’ depiction in the accounting trial of Eratosthenes of the 
process by which the Thirty came to power provides an example.  
His narrative places blame squarely on Theramenes, a member of 
the Thirty, and minimizes the role of the Athenians who did, after 
all, vote the Thirty into office.117  Lysias’ account of the Assembly 
meeting minimizes the citizens’ responsibility as much as possible:  
he states that many in the Assembly initially opposed the proposal, 
and even after the Spartan general threatened to destroy Athens if 
they  did  not  acquiesce,  some  Athenians  got  up  and  left  the 
 
114 See  OSIEL,  supra  note  91,  at  192–95  (discussing  the  trial  of  Auschwitz 
guards, which seems to have had this effect, and the 1983 junta trial in Argentina, 
which also seems to have been premised on this idea, but was less successful). 
115 See LYSIAS, Against Eratosthenes, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 113, 121 [Lys. 
12.28]. 
116 See id. at 121 (addressing the jurors as victims of the Thirty) [Lys. 12.30]; 
LYSIAS, Against Euandrus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 271, 274–78 (illustrating how 
the prosecutors depicted the entire citizenry as the victims of the Thirty in the 
trials of Euandrus) [Lys. 26.1–16]; ISOCRATES, Special Plea Against Callimachus, in 
ISOCRATES I, supra note 2, at 97 (assuming all the juries had been in Piraeus rather 
than the city) [Isoc. 18.2]. 
117 See  LYSIAS,  Against  Eratosthenes,  in  LYSIAS,  supra  note  6,  at 1 1 3 ,  1 3 0 –31 
(chronicling the Thirty’s rise to power beginning with Theramenes’ demand that 
the city be entrusted to the control of thirty men) [Lys. 12.70–75]. LANNI.DOC  1/9/11  7:45 PM 
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Assembly, others stayed but remained silent, and only a “few evil-
minded scoundrels voted the proposal through.”118 
Perhaps  most  striking  is  the  historical  fiction,  employed  in 
several speeches, that every member of the jury was a member of 
the resistance in the Piraeus and/or a direct victim of the Thirty.  
As several scholars have pointed out, although most jury panels 
must  have  included  members  of  the  3000  and  other  types  of 
collaborators, speakers regularly address the jury as former men of 
the Piraeus, and describe how the jurors, addressed as “you,” were 
driven  out  of  the  city,  had  their  property  confiscated,  houses 
invaded and family members taken, took part in freeing the city, 
and returned from the Piraeus. 119 
A  rare  exception  is  a  passage  in  Lysias’  prosecution  of 
Eratosthenes  at  his  accounting,  in  which  he  briefly  addresses 
“those  from  the  city  (astu)”  and  “those  from  the  Piraeus” 
separately.  But even this passage has a unifying message.  Lysias 
depicts  the  men  who  remained  in  the  city  as  innocent  victims 
forced to fight against their own kin:  “you who are from the town 
should  realize  that  the  defendants  ruled  you  so  badly  that  you 
were compelled to fight a war against your brothers, your sons, 
and  your  fellow-citizens  . . . .”120 T h e  p r o s e c u t o r  g o e s  o n  t o  
emphasize that the former men of the city have gone from being 
slaves of the oligarchy and their Spartan garrison to participating 
in governing the polis and joining with the democrats to protect it 
from external threats: 
 
118 Id. at 131 [Lys. 12.75]. 
119 For prosecutors’ attempts to persuade juries that the defendants were the 
victims of the crimes committed by the Thirty, see id. at 121, 127 [Lys. 12.30, 57], 
LYSIAS, Against Agoratus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 137, 148–49 [Lys. 13.47], and 
LYSIAS, Against Euandrus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 271, 274 [Lys. 26.2].  See also 
ANDOCIDES, On the Mysteries, in ANTIPHON AND ANDOCIDES, supra note 46, at 99, 
122 (addressing the jury as if they were all direct opponents of the Thirty’s rule 
and direct participants in the restoration of democracy) [Andoc. 1.81]; ISOCRATES, 
Special Plea Against Callimachus, in ISOCRATES I, supra note 2, at 96, 97 (assuming 
that the entire jury had been in exile in the Piraeus) [Isoc. 18.2]; WOLPERT, supra 
note 5, at 90–94 (describing why speakers address the jury as though they had all 
been in the Piraeus); Cohen, supra note 59, at 341 (discussing the nature of the 
prosecutions of those who had collaborated with the Thirty). 
120 LYSIAS, Against Eratosthenes, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 113, 135 [Lys. 12.92].  
See also ISOCRATES, Special Plea Against Callimachus, in Isocrates I, supra note 2, at 
101,  101–02  (emphasizing  that  while  some  citizens  participated  in  arrests  and 
property confiscations they did so only out of compulsion) [Isoc. 18.17]. LANNI.DOC  1/9/11  7:45 PM 
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Realize that you were ruled by the defendants, who were 
the  worst  of  men;  realize  too  that  you  now  share  the 
government  with  good  men,  you  are  fighting  against 
external enemies, and you are taking counsel for the city; 
and  remember  the  mercenaries  [i.e.,  the  Spartan  garrison 
employed by the Thirty] that the defendants established on 
the  Acropolis  as  guardians  of  their  power  and  of  your 
slavery.121 
One speaker goes so far as to state that the men who did not 
actively  participate  in  the  killings  but  remained  in  the  city  can 
claim  credit  for  the  overthrow  of  the  oligarchy,  suggesting, 
contrary  to  our  historical  evidence,  that  victory  was  secured  by 
widespread political opposition within the city.122  To be sure, the 
use  of  these  rhetorical  topoi  in  court  did  not  erase  individual 
victims’  resentment  against  specific  collaborators  who  had  done 
them harm.  But the collective memory of the oligarchy constructed 
in the courts may have made victims more willing to trust men 
whose level of active collaboration was minimal or unknown to 
them.  For those who had remained in the city, the discourse in the 
courts offered a rationalization for past collaboration and provided 
comfort that there was a place for them in the restored democracy. 
4.1.3.  Praising Amnesty 
Finally, court speeches in the years after the civil war helped 
create a myth in which the Amnesty, and the forgiveness that it 
implied, exemplified the Athenians’ superior character.  To be sure, 
defendants accused of collaboration often defend the Amnesty on 
pragmatic  grounds,  arguing  that  taking  retribution  would 
endanger  the  democracy  by  alienating  former  oligarchs.123  B u t  
 
121 LYSIAS, Against Eratosthenes, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 113, 135 [Lys. 12.94]. 
122 See  LYSIAS,  Against  Euandrus,  in  LYSIAS,  supra  note  6,  at 2 7 1 ,  2 7 8 –79 
(attributing the defeat of the Thirty to the people) [Lys. 26.18–19]. 
123 See ANDOCIDES, supra note 46, at 128 (noting the importance of the jurors’ 
decisions in creating precedents for which laws and customs will be followed by 
the public) [Andoc. 1.105]; ISOCRATES, Special Plea Against Callimachus, in ISOCRATES 
I, supra note 2, at 96, 106 (arguing that if amnesty is destroyed then civil strife will 
result) [Isoc. 18.44]; LYSIAS, On Overthrowing the Democracy, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, 
at 260, 262–68 (speaking in defense of his right to hold public office and arguing 
that the jury should be wary of alienating citizens with accusations of misdeeds 
during the civil war) [Lys. 25.1–28]; James M. Quillin, Achieving Amnesty: The Role 
of  Events,  Institutions,  and  Ideas,  132  TRANSACTIONS  AM.  PHILOLOGICAL  ASS’N 7 1  LANNI.DOC  1/9/11  7:45 PM 
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speakers also praise the Amnesty in a way that made a powerful 
appeal to the Athenians’ honor.  In these passages, the Amnesty is 
transformed from a concession made out of military necessity to an 
act of will that defines the Athenian democratic spirit. 124  Speakers 
argue  that  the  Athenians’  willingness  to  reject  revenge  earned 
them a reputation throughout Greece for extraordinary generosity, 
reasonableness,  and  wisdom.125  U n d e r  t h i s  r e -imagining,  the 
Amnesty  was  not  a  reminder  of  the  darkest  period  in  Athenian 
history, but rather the manifestation of one its high points, worthy 
of celebration.  The speaker in Isocrates 18 states: 
[W]hile our ancestors accomplished many noble things, the 
city has won renown not least from these settlements.  You 
can find many cities that have fought nobly in war, but no 
one could point to a city better advised with regard to civil 
strife (stasis).  Moreover, of those activities that carry risk, 
one  might  ascribe  the  greatest  part  to  luck,  but  no  one 
would attribute the credit for our moderation to anything 
other than our intelligence.126 
We  can  see  evidence  that  this  identification  as  a  democracy 
with moderation took root:  in the fourth century authors refer to 
the Athenians’ characteristic mildness or forbearance in contexts 
unrelated to the civil war.127  Again, it is difficult to imagine that 
 
(2002) (arguing that the surprising leniency toward former oligarchs was rational 
because it appeased former oligarchs and prevented unrest). 
124 See  AESCHINES, O n  t h e  E m b a s s y ,  in  AESCHINES,  supra  note  2,  at  88,  156 
(stating that because of the Amnesty “the world thought our city exceptionally 
wise”) [Aesch. 2.176]; ANDOCIDES, On the Mysteries, in ANTIPHON AND ANDOCIDES, 
supra note 46, at 99, 137–38 (praising the Athenians’ wisdom in refraining from 
taking revenge on those who lived under the Thirty’s rule and arguing that the 
public’s unified vote would determine whether they would rely on the laws of 
Athens or find other means to escape their accusers) [Andoc. 1.140]; Cohen, supra 
note 59, at 354–55 (noting that the portrayal of reconciliation helped unify the 
polis over its enemies); ISOCRATES, Special Plea Against Callimachus, in ISOCRATES I, 
supra note 2,  at 96, 102, 104 (praising Athenians for their moderation and wisdom 
in dealing with civil strife) [Isoc. 18.22, 31–32]. 
125 See ANDOCIDES, On the Mysteries, in ANTIPHON AND ANDOCIDES, supra note 
46, at 99, 137–38 (praising the Athenians as generous and sensible for not seeking 
revenge) [Andoc. 1.140]; AESCHINES, On the Embassy, in AESCHINES, supra note 2, at 
88, 156  (noting that the success of the Amnesty earned the Athenians a world-
wide reputation for wisdom) [Aesch. 2.176]. 
126 ISOCRATES, Special Plea Against Callimachus, in ISOCRATES I, supra note 2, at 
96, 104 [Isoc. 18.31–32]. 
127 See,  e.g.,  ARISTOTLE,  supra n o t e  2 ,  a t  1 6 5  ( d i s c u s s i n g  h o w  w i t h i n  t h e  
customary  forbearance  of  the  Athenian  democracy,  only  those  who  had LANNI.DOC  1/9/11  7:45 PM 
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these  encomia  of  the  Amnesty  could  induce  victims  to  forgive 
individuals  directly  responsible  for  the  murder  of  their  kin.  
Nevertheless,  the  Amnesty—which  was  reaffirmed  by  collective 
oath  each  year  by  jurors  and  members  of  the  Council  and  was 
widely praised in court speeches—may have had some expressive 
effect,  encouraging  the  Athenians  to  live  up  to  their  myths  and 
take a more conciliatory attitude toward former collaborators who 
did not personally cause them harm. 
4.2.   Courts and Indirect Accountability 
A  recurring  theme  in  studies  of  modern  transitions  is  that 
many victims seem to get more satisfaction from the punishment 
or acknowledgment of guilt by local perpetrators, as distinguished 
from broad-ranging investigations of wrongdoing or trials of high-
level  war  criminals.128  A  c o m m o n  c o m p l a i n t  a m o n g  m o d e r n  
victims  is  repeatedly  seeing  neighbors,  co-workers,  and  fellow-
villagers who collaborated in atrocities going about their lives as if 
nothing had happened.129  Due to the fact that Athenian victims 
 
committed crimes during civil unrest were not allowed to live in Athens) [Ar. Ath. 
Pol. 22.4]; LYSIAS, Against Andocides, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 61, 71–72 (referring 
to the Athenians’ “gentleness” with regard to criminal prosecution) [Lys. 6.34].  
See Margaretha DeBrunner Hall,  Even Dogs have Erinyes:   Sanctions in Athenian 
Practice and Thinking, in GREEK LAW IN ITS POLITICAL SETTING 73, 88–89 (L. Foxhall & 
A.D.E. Lewis eds., 1996) (discussing the Athenians’ reputation for mildness and 
arguing that this reputation was largely undeserved). 
128 See, e.g., Anita Isaacs, Truth and the Challenge of Reconciliation in Guatemala, 
in RECONCILIATION(S): TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN POSTCONFLICT SOCIETIES 116, 136–39 
(Joanna  Quinn  ed.,  2009) ( d i s c u s s i n g  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  i n f o r m a l  
acknowledgements  to  local  communities  in  righting  wrongs);  Eric  Stover, 
Witnesses  and  the  Promise  of  Justice  in  the  Hague,  in  MY  NEIGHBOR,  MY  ENEMY: 
JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY 104, 107 (Eric Stover 
&  Harvey  Weinstein  eds.,  2004)  (describing  the  feeling  of  dissatisfaction 
experienced by witnesses who felt that their work would not be complete until 
they testified against local war criminals).  This insight is also part of the impetus 
behind the gacaca courts in Rwanda.  See generally Urusaro Karekezi, Alphonse 
Nshimiyimana, & Beth Mutamba, Localizing Justice:  Gacaca Courts in Post-genocide 
Rwanda, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH 
OF  MASS  ATROCITY  69,  69–84 ( E r i c  S t o v e r  &  H a r v e y  W e i n s t e i n  e d s . ,  2 0 0 4 ) 
(discussing  the  use  of  gacaca  courts  which  allow  local  communities  to  bring 
charges  against  genocide  suspects  who  allegedly  committed  atrocities  in  said 
communities). 
129 See Dmitri A. Sotiropoulos, Swift Gradualism and Variable Outcomes: Vetting 
in Post-Authoritarian Greece, in JUSTICE AS PREVENTION: VETTING PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES 121 (Alexander Mayer-Rieckh & Pablo de Greiff eds., 
2007) [hereinafter JUSTICE AS PREVENTION] (telling the story of a former member of 
the resistance who had been imprisoned under military rule and who on the way LANNI.DOC  1/9/11  7:45 PM 
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could indirectly sanction collaborators for their conduct during the 
oligarchy,  the  Athenians  were  able  to  minimize  this  “impunity 
gap”  at  the  local  level,  while  still  maintaining  the  unifying 
collective  narrative  of  rejecting  vengeance  for  Amnesty.    In  this 
way,  the  courts  fostered  reconciliation  by  offering  some 
accountability  as  a  safety  valve  for  local  resentments  based  on 
crimes committed during the reign of the Thirty. 
Collaboration could be raised in court, without violating the 
terms of the Amnesty, in two forms:  (1) as character evidence in an 
unrelated public or private lawsuit; and (2) in the dokimasia, the 
examination  of  incoming  magistrates.    Where  collaboration w a s  
introduced in an unrelated lawsuit, it was up to the individual jury 
to determine how much weight to accord this character evidence in 
reaching its verdict.  At the accounting, anyone who wished could 
challenge a candidate for any reason, including collaboration.  If 
rejected by the jury, the only penalty was disqualification for office.  
The  accounting  procedure  shares  some  similarities  with  modern 
forms  of  administrative  justice,  such  as  de-Nazification  in 
Germany and lustration in post-Communist Europe.  In all three 
contexts,  those  who  were  affiliated  with  or  participated  in  the 
former regime could be barred from public office and/or public 
employment.130 
Athens’  indirect  accountability  mechanisms  reduced  victims’ 
worries about impunity, but did not go so far as to alienate former 
collaborators by doling out severe sanctions.  Most citizens were 
likely to be selected by lot for office or to face litigation at some 
point in their lives,131 leaving them vulnerable to attacks based on 
their conduct during the oligarchy.  However, this mechanism was 
 
to work, passed by the judge who convicted him sitting in a coffee shop every 
morning, and of another resistance member who had been tortured learning that 
his torturer had become the chief of police).  For similar stories, see Isaacs, supra 
note 128, at 136, which shows that victims in Guatemala lived near informants or 
executioners,  and  TINA  ROSENBERG,  THE  HAUNTED  LAND 3 2 1  ( 1 9 9 6 ) ,  w h i c h  
illustrates how Stasi informants were banned from holding public sector jobs for 
fifteen years. 
130 See  TEITEL,  supra  note  2,  at  149–90  (discussing t h e  u s e  a n d  f o r m s  o f  
administrative  justice  during  periods  of  political  transformation).  See  generally 
JUSTICE  AS  PREVENTION,  supra  note  129  (discussing  various  vetting  procedures 
where  members  of  old  regimes  were  prevented  from  participating  in  newly 
formed governments or public positions). 
131 See Adriaan Lanni, Social Norms in the Courts of Ancient Athens, 1 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS  691,  693 ( 2 0 0 9 )  ( d i s c u s s i n g  both  the  collaborative  and  contentious 
environment Athenian citizens faced). LANNI.DOC  1/9/11  7:45 PM 
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self-limiting in that collaboration only became an issue in court if a 
victim or an enemy brought it up.  Victims who needed to air their 
grievances  against  a  particular  collaborator  were  given  the 
opportunity to do so, but there was no attempt to systematically 
stigmatize or exclude from office all those who participated in the 
oligarchy. 
The uncertainty over whether and when former collaborators 
in  one’s  village  would  face  punishment  through  these  indirect 
mechanisms was much less troubling for those seeking retribution 
in the context of a society that believed in divine sanctions.  Divine 
sanctions were uncertain and unpredictable, and could occur years 
or even generations after a violation.132  Even the awareness that 
those  who  had  participated  in  the  oligarchy  might  face  indirect 
sanctions in court at some later time may have tempered victims’ 
perception of impunity.133 
At the same time, these potential indirect sanctions were not so 
severe  that  they  risked  permanently  alienating  former 
collaborators.    For  one  thing,  the  only  penalty  that  attached  to 
being rejected at one’s accounting was disqualification from office.  
Men who were disqualified in this way could still participate fully 
in  the  Assembly  and  the  law  courts.134  M o r e o v e r ,  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
under the Thirty did not doom a litigant or prospective magistrate; 
this evidence was merely one factor in the jury’s consideration.135  
One man, challenged at his dokimasia because he was a member of 
the Council and the cavalry under the Thirty, nevertheless appears 
to have been confirmed as an archon, one of the highest offices of 
 
132 See Adriaan Lanni, The Laws of War in Ancient Greece, 26 LAW & HIST. REV. 
469, 475 (2008) (discussing the Athenian belief in punishment from the gods). 
133 Of  course,  a l a c k  o f  a p o l o g y  o r  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  g u i l t  o n  t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e  
perpetrators  might  diminish  victims’  satisfaction.    The  limited  sense  of 
accountability  provided  by  the  Athenian  procedures  was  more  acceptable  to 
victims in part because the oligarchic sympathizers who were most likely to draw 
retaliation probably opted to resettle in Eleusis.  See ELSTER, supra note 3, at 22–23, 
who points out that by the time some of those settlers returned to Athens after the 
fall of Eleusis in 401 BC, retributive emotions had some time to diminish. 
134 The one exception was that those who were convicted under the dokimasia 
ton rhetoron were rendered ineligible to speak in the Assembly. 
135 See LYSIAS, For Polystratus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 217, 219–27 (defending 
Polystratus successfully against loss of his rights as a citizen despite charges of 
oligarchic sympathies) [Lys. 20]; LYSIAS, For Mantitheus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 
177,  181  (giving  another  example  of  a  man  being  confirmed  in  office  despite 
challenges at the dokimasia) [Lys. 16.9]. LANNI.DOC  1/9/11  7:45 PM 
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the  democracy.136  A n o t h e r  c o u r t  s p e a k e r  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  m a n y  
cavalry  members  under  the  oligarchy  went  on  to  serve  in  the 
Council and even as generals.137 
Perhaps  most  importantly,  wide-ranging  examination  of 
litigants’  and  prospective  magistrates’  character  was  routine  in 
Athenian courts.  Defendants would not experience discussion of 
their  conduct  under  the  oligarchy  and  any  resulting  indirect 
sanctions as a specific attack aimed at former collaborators, but as 
standard operating procedure in court.  In fact, one defendant in a 
dokimasia claims that he is glad to have the opportunity to refute 
widespread  accusations  that  he  served  in  the  cavalry  under  the 
Thirty: 
The people who force those who are unjustly accused to 
undergo  an  investigation  of  their  life’s  record  are  in  my 
view  responsible  for  great  benefits.  I  am  so  utterly 
confident  in  myself  that  I  expect  even  someone  badly 
disposed toward me to change his mind when he hears me 
speak about what happened and to think much better of me 
in the future.138 
Like many modern vetting procedures, such as lustration, the 
examination of an individual’s conduct under the previous regime 
in  the  accounting  was  both  backward- a n d  f o r w a r d -looking.139  
Disqualification  from  office  was  both  a  sanction  for  past 
 
136 See LYSIAS, Against Euandrus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 271, 273 (discussing 
the unsuccessful prosecution of Euandrus who later served as an archon) [Lys. 
26]. 
137 See LYSIAS, For Mantitheus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 177, 181 (stating that 
several cavalry members under the oligarchy went on to hold high offices) [Lys. 
16.8]. 
138 Id.  at  179–80  [Lys.  16.1–3].  Of  course,  litigants  were  vulnerable  to 
completely fabricated accusations of collaboration, just as they could face false 
accusations  of  all  sorts  of  violations  of  legal  and  social  norms  in  court.    This 
problem was at least reduced by the availability of suits for false witness and the 
likelihood that someone among the hundreds of jurors or spectators might have 
knowledge of the facts and shout down the speaker. 
139 See, e.g., TEITEL, supra note 2, at 164 (discussing Czechoslovakia’s use of 
lustration to bar former state security personnel from a wide variety of jobs).  See 
generally  JUSTICE  AS  PREVENTION,  supra  note  129 ( d i s c u s s i n g  v a r i o u s  v e t t i n g  
measures including lustration).  See CHRISTIANE WILKE, The Shield, the Sword and the 
Party: Vetting the East German Public Sector, in JUSTICE AS PREVENTION, supra note 
129, at 348, 349 (observing that even when the stated purpose of modern vetting 
procedures  is  a  forward-looking  one,  such  as  in  East  Germany,  the  social 
understanding of these procedures is often as a backward-looking sanction). LANNI.DOC  1/9/11  7:45 PM 
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wrongdoing  and  a  safeguard  to  prevent  those  who  committed 
crimes or who had oligarchic sympathies from exercising power in 
the  restored  democracy.    But  unlike  most  modern  vetting 
procedures, the accounting was as concerned with a candidate’s 
current political commitments and view of the Thirty as with his 
past conduct under the former regime.  Wolpert points out that the 
accounting served in part as a ritual in which former collaborators 
publicly pledged their allegiance to the democratic constitution.140  
This does not mean that former collaborators expressed remorse or 
even admitted participation in the oligarchy — in our surviving 
speeches,  litigants  and  prospective  magistrates  accused  of 
collaboration  vehemently  deny  that  they  held  offices  under  the 
Thirty — or were in any way involved in the crimes committed by 
the regime.141  Due to the fact that very few magistrates exercised 
significant individual power, the importance of the dokimasia to the 
security of the democracy lay less in accurately ferreting out and 
excluding from office those with oligarchic sympathies and more 
in the symbolism of these hearings.  Having passed a dokimasia, a 
former  collaborator  might  gain  a  sense  of  membership  and 
belonging  under  the  new  regime,  and  resentment  at  a 
collaborators’  holding  office  might  be  eased  by  his  public 
repudiation  of  the  oligarchy.    Conversely,  rejecting  a  candidate 
allowed  the  demos  to  make  a  statement  about  the  sort  of 
collaboration that it deemed incompatible with full citizenship. 
In sum, the indirect sanctions for collaboration made possible 
by the Athenians’ distinctive legal culture ranged far wider than 
any direct trials of collaborators could possibly have done.  These 
mechanisms  encouraged  reconciliation  by  minimizing  the 
resentment  created  by  the  sense  that  local  collaborators  enjoyed 
impunity  and  by  offering  a  procedure  whereby  those  with 
 
140 See LYSIAS, For Mantitheus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 177, 180 (declaring 
Mantitheus’s loyalty to the current Athenian Constitution) [Lys. 16.3]; WOLPERT, 
supra  note  5,  at  115–16  (discussing t h e  “ s u s p e n s i o n  o f  b e l i e f ”  A t h e n i a n  j u r i e s  
exercised in hearing testimony from former collaborators in which they denied 
any wrongdoing and declared their current allegiance). 
141 E.g., LYSIAS, For Mantitheus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 177, 181 (denying 
any wrongdoing) [Lys. 16.8]; LYSIAS, On a Charge of Overthrowing the Democracy, in 
LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 260, 265 (denying criminal conduct during the oligarchy) 
[Lys.  25.15–16];  LYSIAS,  For  Eryximachus,  in  LYSIAS,  supra  note  6,  at  378,  381 
(asserting his innocence under the rule of the Thirty) [Lys. Fr. 9.110]; PLATO, supra 
note 28, at 57 (denying participation in the crimes of the Thirty, specifically the 
arrest of Leon of Salamis) [Pl. Apol. 32 c–d]. LANNI.DOC  1/9/11  7:45 PM 
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questionable  pasts  could  be  publicly  reintegrated  into  the 
community. 
4.3.   Participation and Social Repair 
Scholars who study conflict resolution and transitional justice 
often  rely  on  the  “contact  hypothesis,”  the  assumption  that 
“tension and hostility between [opposing] groups will be reduced 
when  these  groups  are  brought  in  systematic  contact  with  each 
other.”142  Athens’ highly participatory civic institutions may have 
helped foster reconciliation by encouraging members on opposite 
sides of the civil war to work together in a variety of contexts. 
Jury  service  in  the  courts  was  just  one  of  the  many 
opportunities for men of the city and men of the Piraeus to interact 
productively after the civil war.  Other venues for joint decision-
making  included  the  Assembly,  the  Council,  and  the  deme 
(village)  assemblies.    Service  on  the  Council  of  500  involved 
particularly intense interaction.  The Council met about 275 days a 
year.  During the one-tenth of the year that each member served on 
the fifty-person executive committee, he was expected to live and 
work  in  the  Council  chamber  with  the  rest  of  the  committee.  
Participation in several civic institutions—Council service, military 
service, and performance of the dithyrambic chorus at the Festival 
of  Dionysus,  for  example—was  organized  according  to  tribe, 
which  meant  that  one  was  more  likely t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  a l o n g s i d e  
members of one’s local village.  Repeated productive interactions 
in these various contexts between collaborators and the men of the 
Piraeus may have helped to rebuild trust and foster cooperation 
after the restoration of democracy. 
5.  CONTEMPORARY LESSONS 
Every society in transition must manage the inherent tension 
between the impulse to go back over the past—to understand, to 
record  for  history,  to  judge,  and  to  punish—and  the  impulse  to 
move on, to forfeit full accountability in the interests of peace and 
reconciliation.143  W e  h a v e  s e e n  t h a t  a n c i e n t  A t h e n s ’  s u c c e s s f u l  
 
142 Caitlin  Donnelly  &  Joanne  Hughes,  Contact  and  Culture:  Mechanisms  of 
Reconciliation  in  Schools  in  Northern  Ireland  and  Israel,  in  RECONCILIATION(S): 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE  IN POSTCONFLICT SOCIETIES 147, 150 (Joanna R. Quinn ed., 
2009). 
143 See,  e.g.,  MINOW,  supra  note  1,  at  2  (discussing  the  tension  between 
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reconciliation  managed  this  tension  in  a  unique  way.    The 
Athenians  put  the  past  behind  them  by  instituting  a  formal 
amnesty,  by  creating  a  unifying  (and  misleading) c o l l e c t i v e  
narrative  of  the  war,  and  by  providing  opportunities  for  the 
reintegration  of  collaborators  in  the  democracy  and  shared 
experiences  between  former  antagonists.    At  the  same  time, 
Athens’  legal  institutions  offered  an  outlet  for  private,  local 
resentments by providing ordinary victims with an indirect means 
of airing accusations against quite specific oppressors. 
What  lessons  might  the  Athenian  experience  offer  for  those 
designing  transitional  justice  institutions  today?    Much  of 
transitional  justice  scholarship  utilizes  the  case-study  method; 
scholars  analyze  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  various 
forms of transitional justice institutions in part by examining how 
these  institutions  performed  in  a  variety  of  historical  and/or 
contemporary situations.144  This Article presents Athens as a case 
study of how one society was able to move on.145 
The types of lessons we can draw from the Athenian case are 
limited by evident cultural differences.  The wholesale adoption of 
specific  Athenian  practices  is o b v i o u s l y  n o t  i n  t h e  c a r d s ,  
particularly since the absence of the rule of law is a feature of the 
system  rather  than  a  bug.    Rather,  as  noted  previously,  the 
Athenian case provides some mid-level observations about factors 
that  may  contribute  to  a  successful  transition.    The  Athenian 
experience  suggests  (1)  the  importance  of  granularity,  that  is, 
letting  individual  victims  at  the  local  level  decide  whether  to 
prosecute their antagonists; and (2) that uncovering the truth is not 
always the best way to ensure peace and reconciliation following 
 
144 See  generally  RECONCILIATION(S):  TRANSITIONAL  JUSTICE  IN  POSTCONFLICT 
SOCIETIES  (Joanna R .  Q u i n n  e d . ,  2 0 0 9 )   (citing  several  individual  case  studies); 
ELSTER, supra  note 3 (discussing a variety of historical examples of transitional 
justice);  MINOW,  supra  note  1  (analyzing  the  different  emotional  and  political 
responses to atrocities which were adopted by various countries and populations 
throughout history); TEITEL, supra note 2 (drawing comparisons between several 
historical  and  contemporary  approaches  to  transitional  justice);  Koskenniemi, 
supra note 85 (discussing the function of trials in the context of war crimes in 
Europe); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 3 (analyzing the costs and benefits of 
transitional justice in the context of several historical transitions). 
145 It  is,  of  course,  impossible  to  draw  definitive  conclusions  from  any 
individual case study.  Rather, each case study is merely suggestive, offering some 
insight  into  how  a  particular  approach  to  transitional  justice  played  out  in  a 
specific context.  Hypotheses derived from individual case studies must then be 
tested  against  other  case  studies,  with  close  attention  to  cultural,  political,  or 
economic factors that might cause a successful approach to fail in other contexts. LANNI.DOC  1/9/11  7:45 PM 
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atrocities.  These observations from the Athenian case offer insight 
into prominent contemporary issues in transitional justice.  First, 
the  Athenian  experience  suggests  that  attention  to  local 
resentments and ordinary victims and perpetrators may be just as 
important as centralized, exemplary justice or the exposure of the 
command  structure  behind  atrocities.    Second,  the  Athenian 
experience  invites  us  to  reexamine  whether  the  focus  on  truth 
seeking  (so  common  in  contemporary  transitional  justice 
institutions) is well founded.  In this Part, I will explore each of 
these claims in some detail. 
5.1.   Addressing Local Resentments Through Private Complaint 
Procedures 
The  Athenian  experience  suggests  that  piecemeal  private 
prosecution or complaint procedures at the local level may be as 
important as the more centralized, systematic schemes directed by 
public  officials  that  tend  to  dominate  contemporary  transitional 
justice institutions. 
We have seen that ancient Athens had no systematic program 
of  punishing,  or  even  excluding  from  office,  former  oligarchic 
sympathizers.  Most of the high-level officials under the Thirty fled 
to Eleusis or into exile, and the remainder of the population was 
protected from direct litigation by the Amnesty.  Rather, indirect 
sanctions for collaboration were initiated by individual victims and 
acquaintances,  which  provided  a  safety  valve  to  ease  local 
resentment  in  the  absence  of  direct  sanctions.    Punishment  for 
collaboration was selective and exemplary, in the sense that many 
collaborators escaped these accusations, but there was no official 
decision to single out particular offenders for punishment.  In this 
way,  the  flexibility  of  the  Athenian  legal  system  mitigated  the 
tension  between  ordinary,  rule-of-law  justice  and  expedient 
political  settlement.    The  Athenian  approach  also  created  the 
possibility of piecemeal retributive justice without forcing the all-
or-nothing choice that a comprehensive, top-down system invites. 
Many  modern  forms  of  transitional  justice,  particularly 
prosecutions, involve a centralized approach that attempts to focus 
selectively  on  the  most  serious  violations  and,  to  the  extent 
possible,  high-level  offenders.146  M o s t  c o n t e m p o r a r y  c r i m i n a l  
 
146 See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 1, at 31, 40–45 (describing the factors which 
influence selectivity in prosecution and punishment as well as the dangers of this 
selectivity);  TEITEL,  supra  note  2,  at  27–68  (discussing  various  successor  trials LANNI.DOC  1/9/11  7:45 PM 
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approaches  involve  prosecutors  or  other  public  officials 
consciously  selecting  individual  defendants  whose  trials  can 
provide  exemplary  justice,  in  addition  to  furthering  other  goals, 
including the shaping of collective memory.147  Most students of 
transitional  justice  assume  that  one  aim  of  these  selective 
approaches should be to focus on tracing responsibility as far up 
the chain of command as possible.148  Instances where low-level 
actors have faced prosecution, such as the trial of German guards 
for shooting individuals attempting to escape over the Berlin Wall, 
have  drawn  widespread  criticism.149  I n d e e d ,  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  
proving criminal responsibility for high-level actors is commonly 
cited as an advantage that truth commissions have over criminal 
prosecutions.150  M o s t  o f  t h e s e  m o d e r n  a p p r o a ches  are  not  just 
deliberately selective; they are also deliberately centralized.  In fact, 
some  scholars  have  argued  that  the  very  act  of  transferring  the 
responsibility  for  accusation  and  punishment  from  victims  to 
public  bodies  is  absolutely  essential  to  ending  hatred  and 
promoting reconciliation.151 
The  Athenian  example  suggests  that  given  the  inevitably 
selective nature of transitional justice, centralization and focusing 
exclusively  on  major  crimes  and  high-level  officials  may  be 
misguided.    The  Athenian  experience  is  in  keeping  with  some 
recent  research  on  contemporary  transitions  noting  that  victims 
 
throughout  the  course  of  history  which  have  held  prior  political  regimes 
responsible for past injustices). 
147 See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 1, at 46 (“[C]ollective memory probably can 
only be enshrined through trials if the intention to achieve this end is concealed 
from the public audience . . . .”); TEITEL, supra note 2, at 69–118 (analyzing the role 
that legal processes play in constructing transitional narratives of history). 
148 See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 1, at 40–42, 59–61 (discussing the perceived 
unfairness  of  prosecuting  subordinates  without  holding  their  superiors 
responsible and the need to prioritize the interests of the victims). 
149 See  id.  at  59  (describing  a  similar  chain  of  command  involved  in  the 
atrocities in South Africa and emphasizing the difficulty of unraveling this type of 
hierarchical responsibility); TEITEL, supra note 2, at 40 (describing the broad scope 
of the trials in Germany after the Berlin Wall shootings). 
150 See  MINOW,  supra  note  1,  at  60–61  (stating  that  one  advantage  truth 
commissions have over trials is the commissions’ ability to assign blame to high-
level actors in cases where the chain of responsibility would be hard to establish 
in a court of law). 
151 See  id. a t  1 1 –12  (discussing  the  commonly-held  view  that  “the  way  to 
avoid such escalating violence,” arising out of hatred and a desire for vengeance, 
“is to transfer the responsibilities for apportioning blame and punishment from 
victims to public bodies acting according to the rule of law”). LANNI.DOC  1/9/11  7:45 PM 
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often  find  investigations  and  prosecutions  of  local,  low-level 
perpetrators more satisfying than punishment or investigation of 
high-level offenders.152  The Athenian case offers some support for 
approaches  that  do  not  maintain  a  centralized  monopoly  on 
prosecutions but rather provide outlets for individual victims to 
pursue  local  grievances,  including  grievances  against  relatively 
low-level offenders.  Modern approaches in this vein include the 
South  African  Truth  and  Reconciliation  Commission  and  the 
Gacaca courts of Rwanda.  In South Africa, individual victims were 
provided  the  opportunity  to  give  testimony  before  the  human 
rights committee in a non-adversarial format.153  In Rwanda, each 
local community—acting through the local general assembly—met 
to  identify  for  trial  those  suspected  of  involvement  in  local 
massacres.154  A s  t h e s e  t w o  e xamples  demonstrate,  such 
decentralized, locally focused, victim-centered approaches can take 
a variety of forms, and can be deployed alongside more systematic, 
top-down  institutions.155  T h e  A t h e n i a n  e x p e r i e n c e  d o e s  n o t  
recommend a particular institutional design, but merely suggests 
that  approaches  that  provide  an  outlet  for  local,  individual 
 
152 See, e.g., ISAACS, supra note 128, at 136 (citing the Guatemala case as an 
example where victims “frequently insist that neighbors, friends, and relatives are 
guilty,  implicated  in  the  crimes  whether  as  informants  or  as  executioners”); 
Stover, supra note 128, at 106, 115 (emphasizing the importance victims placed on 
receiving  explanations  and  apologies  from  their  neighbors  and  seeing  fellow 
citizens being brought to justice). 
153 See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 1, at 72–74 (emphasizing the contrast between 
the more communal qualities of truth commissions and the rigid, discrete roles of 
traditional courts). 
154 See  KAREKEZI,  supra  note  128,  at  72  (describing  at  the  local  level  how 
Gacaca courts were implemented by observing three phases that were common 
practices  throughout  all  gacaca  courts);  Phil  Clark,  Hybridity,  Holism,  and 
“Traditional” Justice: The Case of the Gacaca Courts in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 39 GEO. 
WASH.  INT’L  L.  REV.  765,  777–89  (2007)  (describing  the  evolution  of  the  gacaca 
courts in Rwanda and the multifaceted purposes served by these courts in the 
Rwandan government and community). 
155 In South Africa, individual victim testimony was combined with, among 
other  things,  a  more  centralized  investigative  process  that  issued  a  report;  the 
Rwandan genocide was addressed not only in the Gacaca courts but also in the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and more formal domestic criminal 
trials.  See Rosemary Nagy, Traditional Justice and Legal Pluralism in Transitional 
Context:  The  Case  of  Rwanda’s  Gacaca  Courts,  in  RECONCILIATIONS:  TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE IN POSTCONFLICT SOCIETIES 86, 87 (Joanna R. Quinn ed., 2009) (“Through the 
face-to-face participation of all community members in gacaca, the government 
sought  to  establish  truth,  justice,  and  reconciliation  on  the  basis  of  Rwandan 
custom.”). LANNI.DOC  1/9/11  7:45 PM 
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resentments can minimize the “impunity gap” created by selective 
justice, thereby fostering reconciliation at the local level.  
5.2.   Questioning the Value of Truth in Reconciliation 
Most  controversially,  the  Athenian  case  casts  doubt  on  an 
underlying  assumption  held  by  many  who  study  transitional 
justice:  the  importance  of  establishing  and  recording  the  truth 
behind  mass  atrocities.156  T h e  r e c e n t  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  o f  t r u t h  a n d  
reconciliation commissions is indicative of a widespread belief that 
investigating  and  recording  how  atrocities  came  about  is  an 
essential component of reconciliation.157 
And  yet,  accurately  assigning  responsibility  for  atrocities 
committed  during  the  tyranny  played  no  role  in  Athens’ 
spectacularly  successful  transition.    We  have  seen  that  the 
Athenian  courts  created  a  false  collective  memory  of  the  war, 
which  focused  blame  narrowly  on  the  Thirty  and  denied  the 
widespread collaboration and participation by ordinary Athenians 
in the violence.  This narrative appears to have promoted a sense of 
unity among the populace.  To be sure, the use of these fictions in 
court did not erase individual victims’ resentment against specific 
collaborators  who  had  done  them  harm.    But  the  collective 
memory of the oligarchy constructed in the courts may have made 
victims  more  willing  to  trust  men  whose  level  of  active 
collaboration was minimal or unknown to them.  For those who 
had  remained  in  the  city,  the  discourse  in  the  courts  offered  a 
rationalization  for  past  collaboration  and  provided  comfort  that 
there was a place for them in the restored democracy. 
The  Athenian  experience  suggests  that  there  may  be  some 
instances where a shared fiction might do more to foster unity and 
reconciliation than the truth.158  The myth of widespread popular 
 
156 See, e.g., TEITEL, supra note 2, at 69–118 (discussing the establishment of 
historical truth as a central function of transitional justice).  But see Erin Daly, 
Truth Skepticism: An Inquiry into the Value of Truth in Times of Transition, 2 INT.’L J. 
OF TRANSITIONAL JUST. 23, 36–39 (2008) (providing a more skeptical account of the 
role of truth in reconciliation). 
157 See, e.g., Geoff Dancy et al., The Turn to Truth: Trends in Truth Commission 
Experimentation, 9 J. HUM. RTS. 45 (2010) (analyzing the proliferation and evolution 
of truth commissions throughout the world). 
158 I am not suggesting consciously attempting to create such a shared fiction, 
which poses all sorts of difficulties.  See OSIEL, supra note 91, at 240–92 (discussing 
the promises and pitfalls of consciously creating collective memory, including the 
creation of misleading accounts of history).  Rather, I am simply suggesting that LANNI.DOC  1/9/11  7:45 PM 
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opposition  in  France  to  the  Nazi  occupation  provides  a  similar 
example.159  O f  c o u r s e ,  t h e r e  m a y  b e  i n d e p e n d e n t  n o r m a t i v e  
reasons to insist on uncovering the truth regarding prior atrocities.  
But  the  Athenian  case  suggests  that  at  least  in  some  situations 
pursuing a true account of who bears responsibility for atrocities 
may not be necessary, or even desirable, if the primary aim is to 
ensure an enduring, peaceful reconciliation. 
The Athenian courts did not seek to hash out the truth; because 
there was no public prosecutor and no detailed understanding of 
what  constituted  collaboration,  they  did  not  stir  up  grievances 
unnecessarily.  But they also allowed the airing of any wrong, no 
matter  how  old  or  unconnected  to  the  subject  of  the  suit.  
Moreover,  they  were  inscrutable  in  their  adjudications—no  one 
knew  why  the  jurors  decided  as  they  did,  and  no  rule  was 
established.  Did the jury believe that an allegation of collaboration 
was  untrue,  or  did  it  find  that  the  allegation,  even  if  true,  was 
outweighed by other factors?  No one knew.  But clarity in the 
wake of civil war is not necessarily a virtue.  People told their story 
and got their verdict; they believed what they wanted to believe 
about what the verdict meant.  The system moved on to the next 
case, and slowly everyone got on with his or her lives. 
 
 
the widespread assumption that uncovering the truth is necessary to a successful 
transition may be incorrect. 
159 See id. at 101 (describing how the initial scope of the postwar criminal 
trials  in  France  was  limited  to  high-ranking  officials  and  to  those  in  other 
prominent  positions,  although  in  many  cases  the  general  population  also 
participated in the atrocities). 